Numerous writers have made this point. For example, in Karl Polanyi's flawed masterpiece The Great Transformation we read that "the road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organised and controlled interventionism" by the state. [p. 140] This intervention took many forms -- for example, state support during "mercantilism," which allowed the "manufactures" (i.e. industry) to survive and develop, enclosures of common land, and so forth. In addition, the slave trade, the invasion and brutal conquest of the Americas and other "primitive" nations, and the looting of gold, slaves, and raw materials from abroad also enriched the European economy, giving the development of capitalism an added boost. Thus Kropotkin:
"The history of the genesis of capital has already been told by socialists many times. They have described how it was born of war and pillage, of slavery and serfdom, of modern fraud and exploitation. They have shown how it is nourished by the blood of the worker, and how little by little it has conquered the whole world . . . Law . . . has followed the same phases as capital . . . they have advanced hand in hand, sustaining one another with the suffering of mankind." [Op. Cit., p. 207]
This process is what Karl Marx termed "primitive accumulation" and was marked by extensive state violence. Capitalism, as he memorably put it, "comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt" and the "starting-point of the development that gave rise both to the wage-labourer and to the capitalist was the enslavement of the worker." [Capital, vol. 1, p. 926 and p. 875] Or, if Kropotkin and Marx seem too committed to be fair, we have John Stuart Mill's summary that the "social arrangements of modern Europe commenced from a distribution of property which was the result, not of just partition, or acquisition by industry, but of conquest and violence." [Principles of Political Economy, p. 15]
The same can be said of all countries. As such, when supporters of "libertarian" capitalism say they are against the "initiation of force," they mean only new initiations of force: for the system they support was born from numerous initiations of force in the past (moreover, it also requires state intervention to keep it going -- section D.1 addresses this point in some detail). Indeed, many thinkers have argued that it was precisely this state support and coercion (particularly the separation of people from the land) that played the key role in allowing capitalism to develop rather than the theory that "previous savings" did so. As left-wing German thinker Franz Oppenheimer (whom Murray Rothbard selectively quoted) argued, "the concept of a 'primitive accumulation,' or an original store of wealth, in land and in movable property, brought about by means of purely economic forces" while "seem[ing] quite plausible" is in fact "utterly mistaken; it is a 'fairly tale,' or it is a class theory used to justify the privileges of the upper classes." [The State, pp. 5-6] As Individualist anarchist Kevin Carson summarised as part of his excellent overview of this historic process:
"Capitalism has never been established by means of the free market. It has always been established by a revolution from above, imposed by a ruling class with its origins in the Old Regime . . . by a pre-capitalist ruling class that had been transformed in a capitalist manner. In England, it was the landed aristocracy; in France, Napoleon III's bureaucracy; in Germany, the Junkers; in Japan, the Meiji. In America, the closest approach to a 'natural' bourgeois evolution, industrialisation was carried out by a mercantilist aristocracy of Federalist shipping magnates and landlords." ["Primitive Accumulation and the Rise of Capitalism," Studies in Mutualist Political Economy]
This, the actual history of capitalism, will be discussed in the following sections. So it is ironic to hear right-"libertarians" sing the praises of a capitalism that never existed and urge its adoption by all nations, in spite of the historical evidence suggesting that only state intervention made capitalist economies viable -- even in that Mecca of "free enterprise," the United States. As Noam Chomsky argues, "who but a lunatic could have opposed the development of a textile industry in New England in the early nineteenth century, when British textile production was so much more efficient that half the New England industrial sector would have gone bankrupt without very high protective tariffs, thus terminating industrial development in the United States? Or the high tariffs that radically undermined economic efficiency to allow the United States to develop steel and other manufacturing capacities? Or the gross distortions of the market that created modern electronics?" [World Orders, Old and New, p. 168] Such state interference in the economy is often denounced and dismissed by right-"libertarians" as mercantilism. However, to claim that "mercantilism" is not capitalism makes little sense. Without mercantilism, "proper" capitalism would never have developed, and any attempt to divorce a social system from its roots is ahistoric and makes a mockery of critical thought (particularly as "proper" capitalism turns to mercantilism regularly).
Similarly, it is somewhat ironic when "anarcho"-capitalists and other right "libertarians" claim that they support the freedom of individuals to choose how to live. After all, the working class was not given that particular choice when capitalism was developing. Instead, their right to choose their own way of life was constantly violated and denied -- and justified by the leading capitalist economists of the time. To achieve this, state violence had one overall aim, to dispossess the labouring people from access to the means of life (particularly the land) and make them dependent on landlords and capitalists to earn a living. The state coercion "which creates the capital-relation can be nothing other than the process which divorces the worker from the ownership of the conditions of his own labour; it is a process which operates two transformations, whereby the social means of subsistence and production are turned into capital, and the immediate producers are turned into wage-labourers. So-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production." [Marx, Op. Cit., pp. 874-5] So to claim that now (after capitalism has been created) we get the chance to try and live as we like is insulting in the extreme. The available options we have are not independent of the society we live in and are decisively shaped by the past. To claim we are "free" to live as we like (within the laws of capitalism, of course) is basically to argue that we are able (in theory) to "buy" the freedom that every individual is due from those who have stolen it from us in the first place. It ignores the centuries of state violence required to produce the "free" worker who makes a "voluntary" agreement which is compelled by the social conditions that this created.
The history of state coercion and intervention is inseparable from the history of capitalism: it is contradictory to celebrate the latter while claiming to condemn the former. In practice capitalism has always meant intervention in markets to aid business and the rich. That is, what has been called by supporters of capitalism "laissez-faire" was nothing of the kind and represented the political-economic program of a specific fraction of the capitalist class rather than a set of principles of "hands off the market." As individualist anarchist Kevin Carson summaries, "what is nostalgically called 'laissez-faire' was in fact a system of continuing state intervention to subsidise accumulation, guarantee privilege, and maintain work discipline." [The Iron Fist behind the Invisible Hand] Moreover, there is the apparent unwillingness by such "free market" advocates (i.e. supporters of "free market" capitalism) to distinguish between historically and currently unfree capitalism and the other truly free market economy that they claim to desire. It is common to hear "anarcho"-capitalists point to the state-based capitalist system as vindication of their views (and even more surreal to see them point to pre-capitalist systems as examples of their ideology). It should be obvious that they cannot have it both ways.
In other words, Rothbard and other "anarcho"-capitalists treat capitalism as if it were the natural order of things rather than being the product of centuries of capitalist capture and use of state power to further their own interests. The fact that past uses of state power have allowed capitalist norms and assumptions to become the default system by their codification in property law and justified by bourgeois economic does not make it natural. The role of the state in the construction of a capitalist economy cannot be ignored or downplayed as government has always been an instrument in creating and developing such a system. As one critic of right-"libertarian" ideas put it, Rothbard "completely overlooks the role of the state in building and maintaining a capitalist economy in the West. Privileged to live in the twentieth century, long after the battles to establish capitalism have been fought and won, Rothbard sees the state solely as a burden on the market and a vehicle for imposing the still greater burden of socialism. He manifests a kind of historical nearsightedness that allows him to collapse many centuries of human experience into one long night of tyranny that ended only with the invention of the free market and its 'spontaneous' triumph over the past. It is pointless to argue, as Rothbard seems ready to do, that capitalism would have succeeded without the bourgeois state; the fact is that all capitalist nations have relied on the machinery of government to create and preserve the political and legal environments required by their economic system." That, of course, has not stopped him "critis[ing] others for being unhistorical." [Stephen L. Newman, Liberalism at Wit's End, pp. 77-8 and p. 79]
Thus we have a key contradiction within "anarcho"-capitalism. While they bemoan state intervention in the market, their underlying assumption is that it had no real effect on how society has evolved over the centuries. By a remarkable coincidence, the net effect of all this state intervention was to produce a capitalist economy identical in all features as one which would have been produced if society had been left alone to evolve naturally. It does seem strange that state violence would happen to produce the same economic system as that produced by right-"libertarians" and Austrian economists logically deducing concepts from a few basic axioms and assumptions. Even more of a coincidence, these conclusions also happen to be almost exactly the same as what those who have benefited from previous state coercion want to hear -- namely, the private property is good, trade unions and strikes are bad, that the state should not interfere with the power of the bosses and should not even think about helping the working class (employed or unemployed). As such, while their advice and rhetoric may have changed, the social role of economists has not. State action was required to dispossess the direct producers from the means of life (particularly the land) and to reduce the real wage of workers so that they have to provide regular work in a obedient manner. In this, it and the capitalists received much advice from the earliest economists as Marxist economic historian Michael Perelman documents in great detail. As he summarises, "classical political economy was concerned with promoting primitive accumulation in order to foster capitalist development, even though the logic of primitive accumulation was in direct conflict with the classical political economists' purported adherence to the values of laissez-faire." [The Invention of Capitalism, p. 12] The turn to "laissez-faire" was possible because direct state power could be mostly replaced by economic power to ensure the dependency of the working class.
Needless to say, some right-"libertarians" recognise that the state played some role in economic life in the rise and development of capitalism. So they contrast "bad" business people (who took state aid) and "good" ones (who did not). Thus Rothbard's comment that Marxists have "made no particular distinction between 'bourgeoisie' who made use of the state, and bourgeoisie who acted on the free market." [The Ethics of Liberty, p. 72] But such an argument is nonsense as it ignores the fact that the "free market" is a network (and defined by the state by the property rights it enforces). This means that state intervention in one part of the economy will have ramifications in other parts, particularly if the state action in question is the expropriation and/or protection of productive resources (land and workplaces) or the skewing of the labour market in favour of the bosses. In other words, the individualistic perspective of "anarcho"-capitalism blinds its proponents to the obvious collective nature of working class exploitation and oppression which flows from the collective and interconnected nature of production and investment in any real economy. State action supported by sectors of the capitalist class has, to use economic jargon, positive externalities for the rest. They, in general, benefit from it as a class just as working class people suffers from it collectively as it limits their available choices to those desired by their economic and political masters (usually the same people). As such, the right-"libertarian" fails to understand the class basis of state intervention.
For example, the owners of the American steel and other companies who grew rich and their companies big behind protectionist walls were obviously "bad" bourgeoisie. But were the bourgeoisie who supplied the steel companies with coal, machinery, food, "defence" and so on not also benefiting from state action? And the suppliers of the luxury goods to the wealthy steel company owners, did they not benefit from state action? Or the suppliers of commodities to the workers that laboured in the steel factories that the tariffs made possible, did they not benefit? And the suppliers to these suppliers? And the suppliers to these suppliers? Did not the users of technology first introduced into industry by companies protected by state orders also not benefit? Did not the capitalists who had a large pool of landless working class people to select from benefit from the "land monopoly" even though they may not have, unlike other capitalists, directly advocated it? It increased the pool of wage labour for all capitalists and increased their bargaining position/power in the labour market at the expense of the working class. In other words, such a policy helped maintain capitalist market power, irrespective of whether individual capitalists encouraged politicians to vote to create/maintain it. And, similarly, all American capitalists benefited from the changes in common law to recognise and protect capitalist private property and rights that the state enforced during the 19th century (see section B.2.5).
Rothbard, in other words, ignores class theft and the accumulative effect of stealing both productive property and the products of the workers who use it. He considered the "moral indignation" of socialism arose from the argument "that the capitalists have stolen the rightful property of the workers, and therefore that existing titles to accumulated capital are unjust." He argued that given "this hypothesis, the remainder of the impetus for both Marxism and anarchosyndicalism follow quite logically." However, Rothbard's "solution" to the problem of past force seems to be (essentially) a justification of existing property titles and not a serious attempt to understand or correct past initiations of force that have shaped society into a capitalist one and still shape it today. This is because he is simply concerned with returning property which has been obviously stolen and can be returned to those who have been directly dispossessed or their descendants (for example, giving land back to peasants or tenant farmers). If this cannot be done then the "title to that property, belongs properly, justly and ethically to its current possessors." [Op. Cit., p. 52 and p. 57] At best, he allows nationalised property and any corporation which has the bulk of its income coming from the state to be "homesteaded" by their workers (which, according to Rothbard's arguments for the end of Stalinism, means they will get shares in the company). The end result of his theory is to leave things pretty much as they are. This is because he could not understand that the exploitation of the working class was/is collective in nature and, as such, is simply impossible to redress it in his individualistic term of reference.
To take an obvious example, if the profits of slavery in the Southern states of America were used to invest in factories in the Northern states (as they were), does giving the land to the freed slaves in 1865 really signify the end of the injustice that situation produced? Surely the products of the slaves work were stolen property just as much as the land was and, as a result, so is any investment made from it? After all, investment elsewhere was based on the profits extracted from slave labour and "much of the profits earned in the northern states were derived from the surplus originating on the southern plantations." [Perelman, Op. Cit., p. 246] In terms of the wage workers in the North, they have been indirectly exploited by the existence of slavery as the investment this allowed reduced their bargaining power on the market as it reduced their ability to set up business for themselves by increasing the fixed costs of so doing. And what of the investment generated by the exploitation of these wage workers? As Mark Leier points out, the capitalists and landlords "may have purchased the land and machinery, but this money represented nothing more than the expropriated labour of others." [Bakunin, p. 111] If the land should be returned to those who worked it as Rothbard suggests, why not the industrial empires that were created on the backs of the generations of slaves who worked it? And what of the profits made from the generations of wage slaves who worked on these investments? And what of the investments which these profits allowed? Surely if the land should be given to those who worked it then so must any investments it generated? And assuming that those currently employed can rightly seize their workplaces, what about those previously employed and their descendants? Why should they be excluded from the riches their ancestors helped create?
To talk in terms of individuals misses all this and the net result is to ensure that the results of centuries of coercion and theft are undisturbed. This is because it is the working class as a whole who have been expropriated and whose labour has been exploited. The actual individuals involved and their descendants would be impossible to identify nor would it be possible to track down how the stolen fruits of their labour were invested. In this way, the class theft of our planet and liberty as well as the products of generations of working class people will continue safely.
Needless to say, some governments interfere in the economy more than others. Corporations do not invest in or buy from suppliers based in authoritarian regimes by accident. They do not just happen to be here, passively benefiting from statism and authoritarianism. Rather they choose between states to locate in based precisely on the cheapness of the labour supply. In other words, they prefer to locate in dictatorships and authoritarian regimes in Central America and Southeast Asia because those regimes interfere in the labour market the most -- while, of course, talking about the very "free market" and "economic liberty" those regimes deny to their subjects. For Rothbard, this seems to be just a coincidence or a correlation rather than systematic for the collusion between state and business is the fault, not of capitalism, but simply of particular capitalists. The system, in other words, is pure; only individuals are corrupt. But, for anarchists, the origins of the modern capitalist system lies not in the individual qualities of capitalists as such but in the dynamic and evolution of capitalism itself -- a complex interaction of class interest, class struggle, social defence against the destructive actions of the market, individual qualities and so forth. In other words, Rothbard's claims are flawed -- they fail to understand capitalism as a system, its dynamic nature and the authoritarian social relationships it produces and the need for state intervention these produce and require.
So, when the right suggests that "we" be "left alone," what they mean by "we" comes into clear focus when we consider how capitalism developed. Artisans and peasants were only "left alone" to starve (sometimes not even that, as the workhouse was invented to bring vagabonds to the joy of work), and the working classes of industrial capitalism were only "left alone" outside work and for only as long as they respected the rules of their "betters." As Marx memorably put it, the "newly freed men became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed of all their own means of production, and all the guarantees of existence afforded by the old feudal arrangements. And this history, the history of their expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire." [Op. Cit., p. 875] As for the other side of the class divide, they desired to be "left alone" to exercise their power over others as we will see. That modern "capitalism" is, in effect, a kind of "corporate mercantilism," with states providing the conditions that allow corporations to flourish (e.g. tax breaks, subsidies, bailouts, anti-labour laws, etc.) says more about the statist roots of capitalism than the ideologically correct definition of capitalism used by its supporters.
In fact, if we look at the role of the state in creating capitalism we could be tempted to rename "anarcho"-capitalism "marxian-capitalism". This is because, given the historical evidence, a political theory can be developed by which the "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie" is created and that this capitalist state "withers away" into "anarchy". That this means replacing the economic and social ideas of Marxism and their replacement by their direct opposite should not mean that we should reject the idea (after all, that is what "anarcho"-capitalism has done to Individualist Anarchism!). But we doubt that many "anarcho"-capitalists will accept such a name change (even though this would reflect their politics far better; after all they do not object to past initiations of force, just current ones and many do seem to think that the modern state will wither away due to market forces).
This is suggested by the fact that Rothbard did not advocate change from below as the means of creating "anarchy." He helped found the so-called Libertarian Party in 1971 which, like Marxists, stands for political office. With the fall of Stalinism in 1989, Rothbard faced whole economies which could be "homesteaded" and he argued that "desocialisation" (i.e., de-nationalisation as, like Leninists, he confused socialisation with nationalisation) "necessarily involves the action of that government surrendering its property to its private subjects . . . In a deep sense, getting rid of the socialist state requires that state to perform one final, swift, glorious act of self-immolation, after which it vanishes from the scene." (compare to Engels' comment that "the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society" is the state's "last independent act as a state." [Selected Works, p. 424]). He considered the "capital goods built by the State" as being "philosophically unowned" yet failed to note whose labour was exploited and taxed to build them in the first place (needless to say, he rejected the ideas of shares to all as this would be "egalitarian handouts . . . to undeserving citizens," presumably the ill, the unemployed, retirees, mothers, children, and future generations). [The Logic of Action II, p. 213, p. 212 and p. 209]
Industrial plants would be transferred to workers currently employed there, but not by their own direct action and direct expropriation. Rather, the state would do so. This is understandable as, left to themselves, the workers may not act quite as he desired. Thus we see him advocating the transfer of industry from the state bureaucracy to workers by means of "private, negotiable shares" as ownership was "not to be granted to collectives or co-operatives or workers or peasants holistically, which would only bring back the ills of socialism in a decentralised and chaotic syndicalist form." His "homesteading" was not to be done by the workers themselves rather it was a case of "granting shares to workers" by the state. He also notes that it should be a "priority" for the government "to return all stolen, confiscated property to its original owners, or to their heirs." This would involve "finding original landowners" -- i.e., the landlord class whose wealth was based on exploiting the serfs and peasants. [Op. Cit., p. 210 and pp. 211-2] Thus expropriated peasants would have their land returned but not, apparently, any peasants working land which had been taken from their feudal and aristocratic overlords by the state. Thus those who had just been freed from Stalinist rule would have been subjected to "libertarian" rule to ensure that the transition was done in the economically correct way. As it was, the neo-classical economists who did oversee the transition ensured that ownership and control transferred directly to a new ruling class rather than waste time issuing "shares" which would eventually end up in a few hands due to market forces (the actual way it was done could be considered a modern form of "primitive accumulation" as it ensured that capital goods did not end up in the hands of the workers).
But this is beside the point. The fact remains that state action was required to create and maintain capitalism. Without state support it is doubtful that capitalism would have developed at all. So the only "capitalism" that has existed is a product of state support and intervention, and it has been characterised by markets that are considerably less than free. Thus, serious supporters of truly free markets (like the American Individualist Anarchists) have not been satisfied with "capitalism" -- have, in fact, quite rightly and explicitly opposed it. Their vision of a free society has always been at odds with the standard capitalist one, a fact which "anarcho"-capitalists bemoan and dismiss as "mistakes" and/or the product of "bad economics." Apparently the net effect of all this state coercion has been, essentially, null. It has not, as the critics of capitalism have argued, fundamentally shaped the development of the economy as capitalism would have developed naturally by itself. Thus an economy marked by inequalities of wealth and power, where the bulk of the population are landless and resourceless and where interest, rent and profits are extracted from the labour of working people would have developed anyway regardless of the state coercion which marked the rise of capitalism and the need for a subservient and dependent working class by the landlords and capitalists which drove these policies simply accelerated the process towards "economic liberty." However, it is more than mere coincidence that capitalism and state coercion are so intertwined both in history and in current practice.
In summary, like other apologists for capitalism, right-wing "libertarians" advocate that system without acknowledging the means that were necessary to create it. They tend to equate it with any market system, failing to understand that it is a specific kind of market system where labour itself is a commodity. It is ironic, of course, that most defenders of capitalism stress the importance of markets (which have pre-dated capitalism) while downplaying the importance of wage labour (which defines it) along with the violence which created it. Yet as both anarchists and Marxists have stressed, money and commodities do not define capitalism any more than private ownership of the means of production. So it is important to remember that from a socialist perspective capitalism is not identical to the market. As we stressed in section C.2, both anarchists and Marxists argue that where people produce for themselves, is not capitalist production, i.e. when a worker sells commodities this is not capitalist production. Thus the supporters of capitalism fail to understand that a great deal of state coercion was required to transform pre-capitalist societies of artisans and peasant farmers selling the produce of their labour into a capitalist society of wage workers selling themselves to bosses, bankers and landlords.
Lastly, it should be stressed that this process of primitive accumulation is not limited to private capitalism. State capitalism has also had recourse to such techniques. Stalin's forced collectivisation of the peasantry and the brutal industrialisation involved in five-year plans in the 1930s are the most obvious example). What took centuries in Britain was condensed into decades in the Soviet Union and other state capitalist regimes, with a corresponding impact on its human toil. However, we will not discuss these acts of state coercion here as we are concerned primarily with the actions required to create the conditions required for private capitalism.
Needless to say, this section cannot hope to go into all the forms of
state intervention across the globe which were used to create or impose
capitalism onto an unwilling population. All we can do is provide a
glimpse into the brutal history of capitalism and provide enough
references for those interested to pursue the issue further. The first
starting point should be Part VIII ("So-Called Primitive Accumulation")
of volume 1 of Marx's Capital. This classic account of the origins of
capitalism should be supplemented by more recent accounts, but its basic
analysis is correct. Marxist writers have expanded on Marx's analysis, with
Maurice Dobb's Studies in the Development of Capitalism and David McNally's
Against the Market are worth consulting, as is Michael Perelman's The
Invention of Capitalism. Kropotkin's Mutual Aid has a short
summary of state action in destroying communal institutions and common ownership
of land, as does his The State: It's Historic Role. Rudolf Rocker's
Nationalism and Culture is also essential reading. Individualist Anarchist
Kevin Carson's Studies in Mutualist Political Economy provides an
excellent summary (see part 2, "Capitalism and the State: Past, Present
and Future") as does his essay The Iron Fist behind the Invisible
Hand.
Bookchin went on to note that capitalism existed "with growing significance
in the mixed economy of the West from the fourteenth century up to the
seventeenth" but that it "literally exploded into being in Europe,
particularly England, during the eighteenth and especially nineteenth
centuries." [Op. Cit., p. 181] The question arises, what lay behind
this "growing significance"? Did capitalism "explode" due to its
inherently more efficient nature or where there other, non-economic, forces at
work? As we will show, it was most definitely the second -- capitalism was
born not from economic forces but from the political actions of the social
elites which its usury enriched. Unlike artisan (simple commodity) production,
wage labour generates inequalities and wealth for the few and so will be
selected, protected and encouraged by those who control the state in their
own economic and social interests.
The development of capitalism in Europe was favoured by two social elites,
the rising capitalist class within the degenerating medieval cities and
the absolutist state. The medieval city was "thoroughly changed by the
gradual increase in the power of commercial capital, due primarily to
foreign trade . . . By this the inner unity of the commune was loosened,
giving place to a growing caste system and leading necessarily to a
progressive inequality of social interests. The privileged minorities
pressed ever more definitely towards a centralisation of the political
forces of the community. . . Mercantilism in the perishing city republics
led logically to a demand for larger economic units [i.e. to nationalise
the market]; and by this the desire for stronger political forms was
greatly strengthened . . . Thus the city gradually became a small
state, paving the way for the coming national state." [Rudolf Rocker,
Nationalism and Culture, p. 94] Kropotkin stressed that in this
destruction of communal self-organisation the state not only served the
interests of the rising capitalist class but also its own. Just as the
landlord and capitalist seeks a workforce and labour market made up of
atomised and isolated individuals, so does the state seek to eliminate
all potential rivals to its power and so opposes "all coalitions and
all private societies, whatever their aim." [The State: It's
Historic role, p. 53]
The rising economic power of the proto-capitalists conflicted with that of
the feudal lords, which meant that the former required help to consolidate
their position. That aid came in the form of the monarchical state which,
in turn, needed support against the feudal lords. With the force of
absolutism behind it, capital could start the process of increasing its
power and influence by expanding the "market" through state action.
This use of state coercion was required because, as Bookchin noted,
"[i]n every pre-capitalist society, countervailing forces . . .
existed to restrict the market economy. No less significantly, many
pre-capitalist societies raised what they thought were insuperable obstacles
to the penetration of the State into social life." He noted the "power
of village communities to resist the invasion of trade and despotic political
forms into society's abiding communal substrate." State violence was
required to break this resistance and, unsurprisingly the "one class to
benefit most from the rising nation-state was the European bourgeoisie . . .
This structure . . . provided the basis for the next great system of labour
mobilisation: the factory." [The Ecology of Freedom, pp. 207-8
and p. 336] The absolutist state, noted Rocker, "was dependent upon the
help of these new economic forces, and vice versa and so it "at first
furthered the plans of commercial capital" as its
coffers were filled by the expansion of commerce. Its armies and fleets
"contributed to the expansion of industrial production because they
demanded a number of things for whose large-scale production the shops
of small tradesmen were no longer adapted. Thus gradually arose the
so-called manufactures, the forerunners of the later large industries."
[Op. Cit., pp. 117-8] As such, it is impossible to underestimate
the role of state power in creating the preconditions for both agricultural
and industrial capitalism.
Some of the most important state actions from the standpoint of early
industry were the so-called Enclosure Acts, by which the "commons" -- the
free farmland shared communally by the peasants in most rural villages --
was "enclosed" or incorporated into the estates of various landlords as
private property (see section F.8.3). This
ensured a pool of landless workers who had no option but to sell their labour
to landlords and capitalists. Indeed, the widespread independence caused by the
possession of the majority of households of land caused the rising class of
capitalists to complain, as one put it, "that men who should work as
wage-labourers cling to the soil, and in the naughtiness of their hearts
prefer independence as squatters to employment by a master." [quoted by
Allan Engler, The Apostles of Greed, p. 12] Once in service to a
master, the state was always on hand to repress any signs of "naughtiness"
and "independence" (such as strikes, riots, unions and the like).
For example, Seventeenth century France saw a "number of decrees . . . which forbade
workers to change their employment or which prohibited assemblies of
workers or strikes on pain of corporal punishment or even death. (Even
the Theological Faculty of the University of Paris saw fit to pronounce
solemnly against the sin of workers' organisation)." [Maurice Dobb,
Studies in Capitalism Development, p. 160]
In addition, other forms of state aid ensured that capitalist firms got
a head start, so ensuring their dominance over other forms of work (such
as co-operatives). A major way of creating a pool of resources that could
be used for investment was the use of mercantilist policies which
used protectionist measures to enrich capitalists and landlords at the
expense of consumers and their workers. For example, one of most common
complaints of early capitalists was that workers could not turn up to
work regularly. Once they had worked a few days, they disappeared as
they had earned enough money to live on. With higher prices for food,
caused by protectionist measures, workers had to work longer and harder
and so became accustomed to factory labour. In addition, mercantilism
allowed native industry to develop by barring foreign competition and
so allowed industrialists to reap excess profits which they could then
use to increase their investments. In the words of Marxist economic
historian Maurice Dobb:
As Rocker summarises, "when absolutism had victoriously overcome all
opposition to national unification, by its furthering of mercantilism
and economic monopoly it gave the whole social evolution a direction
which could only lead to capitalism." [Op. Cit., pp. 116-7]
Mercantilist policies took many forms, including the state providing capital
to new industries, exempting them from guild rules and taxes, establishing
monopolies over local, foreign and colonial markets, and granting titles and
pensions to successful capitalists. In terms of foreign trade, the state
assisted home-grown capitalists by imposing tariffs, quotas, and prohibitions
on imports. They also prohibited the export of tools and technology as well
as the emigration of skilled workers to stop competition (this applied to
any colonies a specific state may have had). Other policies were applied
as required by the needs of specific states. For example, the English state
imposed a series of Navigation Acts which forced traders to use English ships to
visit its ports and colonies (this destroyed the commerce of Holland, its chief
rival). Nor should the impact of war be minimised, with the demand for weapons
and transportation (including ships) injecting government spending into the
economy. Unsurprisingly, given this favouring of domestic industry at the expense
of its rivals and the subject working class population the mercantilist period
was one of generally rapid growth, particularly in England.
As we discussed in section C.10, some kind of
mercantilism has always been required for a country to industrialise.
Over all, as economist Paul Ormerod puts it, the "advice to follow pure
free-market polices seems . . . to be contrary to the lessons of virtually
the whole of economic history since the Industrial Revolution . . . every
country which has moved into . . . strong sustained growth . . . has done so
in outright violation of pure, free-market principles." These interventions
include the use of "tariff barriers" to protect infant industries,
"government subsidies" and "active state intervention in the
economy." He summarises: "The model of entrepreneurial activity in
the product market, with judicious state support plus repression in the
labour market, seems to be a good model of economic development."
[The Death of Economics, p. 63]
Thus the social forces at work creating capitalism was a combination of
capitalist activity and state action. But without the support of the
state, it is doubtful that capitalist activity would have been enough
to generate the initial accumulation required to start the economic
ball rolling. Hence the necessity of Mercantilism in Europe and its
modified cousin of state aid, tariffs and "homestead acts" in America.
This is the social context of the expression "laissez-faire" -- a
system which has outgrown the supports that protected it in its early
stages. Just as children eventually rebel against the protection and
rules of their parents, so the capitalists rebelled against the
over-bearing support of the absolutist state. Mercantilist policies
favoured some industries and harmed the growth of others. The rules
and regulations imposed upon those it did favour reduced the flexibility
of capitalists to changing environments. As Rocker argues, "no matter
how the absolutist state strove, in its own interest, to meet the demands
of commerce, it still put on industry countless fetters which became gradually
more and more oppressive . . . [it] became an unbearable burden . . .
which paralysed all economic and social life." [Op. Cit.,
p. 119] All in all, mercantilism became more of a hindrance than a
help and so had to be replaced. With the growth of economic and
social power by the capitalist class, this replacement was made easier. As
Errico Malatesta notes:
Malatesta here indicates the true meaning of "leave us alone," or
"laissez-faire." The absolutist state (not "the state" per se)
began to interfere with capitalists' profit-making activities and authority,
so they determined that it had to go -- which the rising capitalist class
did when they utilised such popular movements as the English, French and
American revolutions. In such circumstances, when the state is not fully
controlled by the capitalist class, then it makes perfect sense to oppose
state intervention no matter how useful it may have been in the past -- a
state run by aristocratic and feudal landlords does not produce class
legislation in quite the right form. That changes when members of the
capitalist class hold state power and when the landlords start acting more
like rural capitalists and, unsurprisingly, laissez-faire was quickly
modified and then abandoned once capitalists could rely on a capitalist
state to support and protect its economic power within society.
When capitalism had been rid of unwanted interference by the hostile use of
state power by non-capitalist classes then laissez-faire had its utility
(just as it has its utility today when attacking social welfare). Once
this had been accomplished then state intervention in society was encouraged
and applauded by capitalists. "It is ironic that the main protagonists of
the State, in its political and administrative authority, were the middle-class
Utilitarians, on the other side of whose Statist banner were inscribed the
doctrines of economic Laissez Faire." [E.P. Thompson, The Making of
the English Working Class, p. 90] Capitalists simply wanted capitalist
states to replace monarchical states, so that heads of government would follow
state economic policies regarded by capitalists as beneficial to their
class as a whole. And as development economist Lance Taylor argues:
In order to attack mercantilism, the early capitalists had to ignore
the successful impact of its policies in developing industry and
a "store of wealth" for future economic activity. As William Lazonick
points out, "the political purpose of [Adam Smith's] the Wealth of
Nations was to attack the mercantilist institutions that the British
economy had built up over the previous two hundred years. Yet in proposing
institutional change, Smith lacked a dynamic historical analysis. In
his attack on these institutions, Smith might have asked why the
extent of the world market available to Britain in the late eighteenth
century was so uniquely under British control. If Smith had
asked this 'big question,' he might have been forced to grant credit
for Britain's extent of the world market to the very mercantilist
institutions he was attacking." Moreover, he "might have recognised
the integral relation between economic and political power in the rise of
Britain to international dominance." Overall, "[w]hat the British
advocates of laissez-faire neglected to talk about was the role that a
system of national power had played in creating conditions for Britain to
embark on its dynamic development path . . . They did not bother to
ask how Britain had attained th[e] position [of 'workshop of the
world'], while they conveniently ignored the on going system of
national power -- the British Empire -- that . . . continued to
support Britain's position." [Business Organisation and the Myth
of the Market Economy, p. 2, p. 3 and p.5]
Similar comments are applicable to American supporters of laissez faire who
fail to notice that the "traditional" American support for world-wide free
trade is quite a recent phenomenon. It started only at the end of the Second
World War (although, of course, within America military Keynesian
policies were utilised). While American industry was developing, the state
and capitalist class had no time for laissez-faire (see
section F.8.5 for details). After it had grown
strong, the United States began preaching laissez-faire to the rest of the
world -- and began to kid itself about its own history, believing its slogans
about laissez-faire as the secret of its success. Yet like all other successful
industrialisers, the state could aid capitalists directly and indirectly (via
tariffs, land policy, repression of the labour movement, infrastructure subsidy
and so on) and it would "leave them alone" to oppress and exploit workers, exploit
consumers, build their industrial empires and so forth.
Takis Fotopoules indicates that the social forces at work in "freeing" the market
did not represent a "natural" evolution towards freedom:
The "freeing" of the market means freeing those who "own" most of
the market (i.e. the wealthy elite) from "effective social control," but
the rest of society was not as lucky. Kropotkin makes a similar point: "While
giving the capitalist any degree of free scope to amass his wealth at the expense
of the helpless labourers, the government has nowhere and never . . .
afforded the labourers the opportunity 'to do as they pleased'." [Anarchism,
p. 182]
So, the expression "laissez-faire" dates from the period when capitalists were
objecting to the restrictions that helped create them in the first place. It has
little to do with freedom as such and far more to do with the needs of capitalist
power and profits. It should also be remembered that at this time the state was
run by the rich and for the rich. Elections, where they took place, involved the
wealthiest of male property owners. This meant there were two aspects in
the call for laissez-faire. On the one hand, by the elite to eliminate
regulations and interventions they found burdensome and felt unnecessary
as their social position was secure by their economic power (mercantilism
evolved into capitalism proper when market power was usually sufficient
to produce dependency and obedience as the working class had been successfully
dispossessed from the land and the means of production). On the other,
serious social reformers (like Adam Smith) who recognised that the
costs of such elite inspired state regulations generally fell on working
class people. The moral authority of the latter was used to bolster the
desire of the former to maximise their wealth by imposing costs of others
(workers, customers, society and the planet's eco-system) with the state
waiting in the wings to support them as and when required.
Unsurprising, working class people recognised the hypocrisy of this
arrangement (even if most modern-day right-"libertarians" do not and
provide their services justifying the actions and desires of repressive
and exploitative oligarchs seeking monopolistic positions). They turned
to political and social activism seeking to change a system which saw
economic and political power reinforce each other. Some (like the Chartists
and Marxists) argued for political reforms to generalise democracy into
genuine one person, one vote. In this way, political liberty would be
used to end the worse excesses of so-called "economic liberty" (i.e.,
capitalist privilege and power). Others (like mutualists) aimed at
economic reforms which ensure that the capitalist class would be
abolished by means of genuine economic freedom. Finally, most other
anarchists argued that revolutionary change was required as the state
and capitalism were so intertwined that both had to be ended at the
same time. However, the struggle against state power always came from
the general population. As Murray Bookchin argued, it is an error to
depict this "revolutionary era and its democratic aspirations as
'bourgeois,' an imagery that makes capitalism a system more committed to
freedom, or even ordinary civil liberties, than it was historically."
[From Urbanisation to Cities, p. 180f] While the capitalist class
may have benefited from such popular movements as the English, American
and French revolutions but these revolutions were not led, never mind
started or fought, by the bourgeoisie.
Not much as changed as capitalists are today seeking maximum freedom from
the state to ensure maximum authority over their wage slaves and society.
The one essential form of support the "Libertarian" right wants the state
(or "defence" firms) to provide capitalism is the enforcement of property
rights -- the right of property owners to "do as they like" on their own
property, which can have obvious and extensive social impacts. What
"libertarian" capitalists object to is attempts by others -- workers,
society as a whole, the state, etc. -- to interfere with the authority
of bosses. That this is just the defence of privilege and power (and
not freedom) has been discussed in section B
and elsewhere in section F, so we will not repeat
ourselves here. Samuel Johnson once observed that "we hear the loudest
yelps for liberty among the drivers of Negroes." [quoted by Noam
Chomsky, Year 501, p. 141] Our modern "libertarian" capitalist drivers
of wage-slaves are yelping for exactly the same kind of "liberty."
However, one of the most blatant of these acts was the enclosure of
common land. In Britain, by means of the Enclosure Acts, land that
had been freely used by poor peasants was claimed by large landlords as
private property. As socialist historian E.P. Thompson summarised, "the
social violence of enclosure consisted . . . in the drastic, total imposition
upon the village of capitalist property-definitions." [The Making of the
English Working Class, pp. 237-8] Property rights, which favoured
the rich, replaced the use rights and free agreement that had governed
peasants use of the commons. Unlike use rights, which rest in the
individual, property rights require state intervention to create and
maintain. "Parliament and law imposed capitalist definitions to
exclusive property in land," Thompson notes. This process involved
ignoring the wishes of those who used the commons and repressing those
who objected. Parliament was, of course, run by and for the rich who
then simply "observed the rules which they themselves had made."
[Customs in Common, p. 163]
Unsurprisingly, many landowners would become rich through the enclosure
of the commons, heaths and downland while many ordinary people had a
centuries old right taken away. Land enclosure was a gigantic swindle
on the part of large landowners. In the words of one English folk poem
written in 1764 as a protest against enclosure:
While technically legal as the landlords made the law, the impact of this
stealing of the land should not be under estimated. Without land,
you cannot live and have to sell your liberty to others. This places
those with capital at an advantage, which will tend to increase,
rather than decrease, the inequalities in society (and so place the
landless workers at an increasing disadvantage over time). This
process can be seen from early stages of capitalism. With the
enclosure of the land an agricultural workforce was created which
had to travel where the work was. This influx of landless ex-peasants
into the towns ensured that the traditional guild system crumbled
and was transformed into capitalistic industry with bosses and wage
slaves rather than master craftsmen and their journeymen. Hence the
enclosure of land played a key role, for "it is clear that economic
inequalities are unlikely to create a division of society into an
employing master class and a subject wage-earning class, unless
access to the means of production, including land, is by some means
or another barred to a substantial section of the community."
[Maurice Dobb, Studies in Capitalist Development, p. 253]
The importance of access to land is summarised by this limerick
by the followers of Henry George (a 19th century writer who argued
for a "single tax" and the nationalisation of land). The Georgites
got their basic argument on the importance of land down these few,
excellent, lines:
It is important to remember that wage labour first developed on the land and it
was the protection of land titles of landlords and nobility, combined with
enclosure, that meant people could not just work their own land. The pressing
economic circumstances created by enclosing the land and enforcing property
rights to large estates ensured that capitalists did not have to point a gun at
people's heads to get them to work long hours in authoritarian, dehumanising
conditions. In such circumstances, when the majority are dispossessed and face
the threat of starvation, poverty, homelessness and so on, "initiation of force"
is not required. But guns were required to enforce the system of
private property that created the labour market in the first place, to enclosure
common land and protect the estates of the nobility and wealthy.
By decreasing the availability of land for rural people, the enclosures destroyed
working-class independence. Through these Acts, innumerable peasants were excluded
from access to their former means of livelihood, forcing them to seek work from
landlords or to migrate to the cities to seek work in the newly emerging factories
of the budding industrial capitalists who were thus provided with a ready source
of cheap labour. The capitalists, of course, did not describe the results this way,
but attempted to obfuscate the issue with their usual rhetoric about civilisation
and progress. Thus John Bellers, a 17th-century supporter of enclosures, claimed
that commons were "a hindrance to Industry, and . . . Nurseries of Idleness
and Insolence." The "forests and great Commons make the Poor that are upon
them too much like the indians." [quoted by Thompson, Op. Cit.,
p. 165] Elsewhere Thompson argues that the commons "were now seen as a dangerous
centre of indiscipline . . . Ideology was added to self-interest. It became a
matter of public-spirited policy for gentlemen to remove cottagers from the
commons, reduce his labourers to dependence." [The Making of the English
Working Class, pp. 242-3] David McNally confirms this, arguing "it was
precisely these elements of material and spiritual independence that many of the
most outspoken advocates of enclosure sought to destroy." Eighteenth-century
proponents of enclosure "were remarkably forthright in this respect. Common
rights and access to common lands, they argued, allowed a degree of social and
economic independence, and thereby produced a lazy, dissolute mass of rural poor
who eschewed honest labour and church attendance . . . Denying such people common
lands and common rights would force them to conform to the harsh discipline
imposed by the market in labour." [Against the Market, p. 19]
The commons gave working-class people a degree of independence which
allowed them to be "insolent" to their betters. This had to be stopped,
as it undermined to the very roots of authority relationships within
society. The commons increased freedom for ordinary people and made
them less willing to follow orders and accept wage labour. The reference
to "Indians" is important, as the independence and freedom of Native
Americans is well documented. The common feature of both cultures was
communal ownership of the means of production and free access to it
(usufruct). This is discussed further in section I.7
(Won't Libertarian Socialism destroy individuality?).
As Bookchin stressed, the factory "was not born from a need to integrate
labour with modern machinery," rather it was to regulate labour and make
it regular. For the "irregularity, or 'naturalness,' in the rhythm and
intensity of traditional systems of work contributed more towards the
bourgeoisie's craze for social control and its savagely anti-naturalistic
outlook than did the prices or earnings demanded by its employees. More
than any single technical factor, this irregularity led to the rationalisation
of labour under a single ensemble of rule, to a discipline of work and
regulation of time that yielded the modern factory . . . the initial
goal of the factory was to dominate labour and destroy the worker's
independence from capital." [The Ecology of Freedom p. 406]
Hence the pressing need to break the workers' ties with the land and so
the "loss of this independence included the loss of the worker's contact
with food cultivation . . . To live in a cottage . . . often meant to
cultivate a family garden, possibly to pasture a cow, to prepare one's
own bread, and to have the skills for keeping a home in good repair. To
utterly erase these skills and means of a livelihood from the worker's
life became an industrial imperative." Thus the worker's "complete
dependence on the factory and on an industrial labour market was a
compelling precondition for the triumph of industrial society . . . The
need to destroy whatever independent means of life the worker could garner
. . . all involved the issue of reducing the proletariat to a condition of
total powerlessness in the face of capital. And with that powerlessness
came a supineness, a loss of character and community, and a decline in
moral fibre." [Bookchin, Op. Cit.,, pp. 406-7] Unsurprisingly, there was
a positive association between enclosure and migration out of villages and
a "definite correlation . . . between the extent of enclosure and reliance
on poor rates . . . parliamentary enclosure resulted in out-migration and a
higher level of pauperisation." Moreover, "the standard of living was
generally much higher in those areas where labourer managed to combine
industrial work with farming . . . Access to commons meant that labourers
could graze animals, gather wood, stones and gravel, dig coal, hunt and
fish. These rights often made the difference between subsistence and
abject poverty." [David McNally, Op. Cit., p. 14 and p. 18]
Game laws also ensured that the peasantry and servants could not legally
hunt for food as from the time of Richard II (1389) to 1831, no person
could kill game unless qualified by estate or social standing.
The enclosure of the commons (in whatever form it took -- see
section F.8.5 for the US equivalent) solved both
problems -- the high cost of labour, and the freedom and dignity of the worker.
The enclosures perfectly illustrate the principle that capitalism requires a
state to ensure that the majority of people do not have free access to any
means of livelihood and so must sell themselves to capitalists in order to
survive. There is no doubt that if the state had "left alone" the European
peasantry, allowing them to continue their collective farming practices
("collective farming" because, as Kropotkin shows, the peasants not only
shared the land but much of the farm labour as well), capitalism could not
have taken hold (see Mutual Aid for more on the European enclosures
[pp. 184-189]). As Kropotkin notes, "[i]nstances of commoners themselves
dividing their lands were rare, everywhere the State coerced them to enforce
the division, or simply favoured the private appropriation of their lands"
by the nobles and wealthy. Thus "to speak of the natural death of the village
community [or the commons] in virtue of economical law is as grim a joke as to
speak of the natural death of soldiers slaughtered on a battlefield."
[Mutual Aid, p. 188 and p. 189]
Once a labour market was created by means of enclosure and the land monopoly,
the state did not passively let it work. When market conditions favoured the
working class, the state took heed of the calls of landlords and capitalists and
intervened to restore the "natural" order. The state actively used the law to lower
wages and ban unions of workers for centuries. In Britain, for example, after the
Black Death there was a "servant" shortage. Rather than allow the market to work
its magic, the landlords turned to the state and the result was "the Statute
of Labourers" of 1351:
Thus state action was required because labourers had increased bargaining power
and commanded higher wages which, in turn, led to inflation throughout the economy.
In other words, an early version of the NAIRU (see section C.9).
In one form or another this statute remained in force right through to the 19th
century (later versions made it illegal for employees to "conspire" to fix wages,
i.e., to organise to demand wage increases). Such measures were particularly sought
when the labour market occasionally favoured the working class. For example,
"[a]fter the Restoration [of the English Monarchy]," noted Dobb, "when
labour-scarcity had again become a serious complaint and the propertied class had
been soundly frightened by the insubordination of the Commonwealth years, the
clamour for legislative interference to keep wages low, to drive the poor into
employment and to extend the system of workhouses and 'houses of correction' and
the farming out of paupers once more reached a crescendo." The same occurred
on Continental Europe. [Op. Cit., p. 234]
So, time and again employers called on the state to provide force to suppress
the working class, artificially lower wages and bolster their economic power and
authority. While such legislation was often difficult to enforce and
often ineffectual in that real wages did, over time, increase, the threat and use
of state coercion would ensure that they did not increase as fast as they may
otherwise have done. Similarly, the use of courts and troops to break unions and
strikes helped the process of capital accumulation immensely. Then there were
the various laws used to control the free movement of workers. "For centuries,"
notes Colin Ward, "the lives of the poor majority in rural England were dominated
by the Poor law and its ramifications, like the Settlement Act of 1697 which debarred
strangers from entering a parish unless they had a Settlement Certificate in which
their home parish agreed to take them back if they became in need of poor relief.
Like the Workhouse, it was a hated institution that lasted into the 20th century."
[Op. Cit., p. 31]
As Kropotkin stressed, "it was the State which undertook to settle . . . griefs"
between workers and bosses "so as to guarantee a 'convenient' livelihood"
(convenient for the masters, of course). It also acted "severely to prohibit
all combinations . . . under the menace of severe punishments . . . Both in the
town and in the village the State reigned over loose aggregations of individuals,
and was ready to prevent by the most stringent measures the reconstitution of any sort
of separate unions among them." Workers who formed unions "were prosecuted
wholesale under the Master and Servant Act -- workers being summarily arrested and
condemned upon a mere complaint of misbehaviour lodged by the master. Strikes were
suppressed in an autocratic way . . . to say nothing of the military suppression of strike
riots . . . To practice mutual support under such circumstances was anything but an
easy task . . . After a long fight, which lasted over a hundred years, the right of
combing together was conquered." [Mutual Aid, p. 210 and p. 211] It took
until 1813 until the laws regulating wages were repealed while the laws against
combinations remained until 1825 (although that did not stop the Tolpuddle Martyrs
being convicted of "administering an illegal oath" and deported to Tasmania in 1834).
Fifty years later, the provisions of the statues of labourers which made it a civil
action if the boss broke his contract but a criminal action if the worker broke it
were repealed. Trade unions were given legal recognition in 1871 while, at the same
time, another law limited what the workers could do in a strike or lockout. The British
ideals of free trade never included freedom to organise.
(Luckily, by then, economists were at hand to explain to the workers that organising
to demand higher wages was against their own self-interest. By a strange coincidence,
all those laws against unions had actually helped the working class by enforcing
the necessary conditions for perfect competition in labour market! What are the chances
of that? Of course, while considered undesirable from the perspective of mainstream
economists -- and, by strange co-incidence, the bosses -- unions are generally not
banned these days but rather heavily regulated. The freedom loving, deregulating
Thatcherites passed six Employment Acts between 1980 and 1993 restricting industrial
action by requiring pre-strike ballots, outlawing secondary action, restricting
picketing and giving employers the right to seek injunctions where there is doubt
about the legality of action -- in the workers' interest, of course as, for some
reason, politicians, bosses and economists have always known what best for
trade unionists rather than the trade unionists themselves. And if they objected,
well, that was what the state was for.)
So to anyone remotely familiar with working class history the notion that there could
be an economic theory which ignores power relations between bosses and workers is a
particularly self-serving joke. Economic relations always have a power element,
even if only to protect the property and power of the wealthy -- the Invisible Hand
always counts on a very visible Iron Fist when required. As Kropotkin memorably put
it, the rise of capitalism has always seen the State "tighten the screw for
the worker" and "impos[ing] industrial serfdom." So what the bourgeoisie
"swept away as harmful to industry" was anything considered as "useless and
harmful" but that class "was at pains not to sweep away was the power
of the State over industry, over the factory serf." Nor should the role of public
schooling be overlooked, within which "the spirit of voluntary servitude was
always cleverly cultivated in the minds of the young, and still is, in order to
perpetuate the subjection of the individual to the State." [The
State: Its Historic Role, pp. 52-3 and p. 55] Such education also ensured that
children become used to the obedience and boredom required for wage slavery.
Like the more recent case of fascist Chile, "free market" capitalism was
imposed on the majority of society by an elite using the authoritarian
state. This was recognised by Adam Smith when he opposed state
intervention in The Wealth of Nations. In Smith's day, the government
was openly and unashamedly an instrument of wealth owners. Less than
10 per cent of British men (and no women) had the right to vote. When
Smith opposed state interference, he was opposing the imposition of
wealth owners' interests on everybody else (and, of course, how "liberal",
never mind "libertarian", is a political system in which the many follow
the rules and laws set-down in the so-called interests of all by the
few? As history shows, any minority given, or who take, such power will
abuse it in their own interests). Today, the situation is reversed, with
neo-liberals and right-"libertarians" opposing state interference in the
economy (e.g. regulation of Big Business) so as to prevent the public
from having even a minor impact on the power or interests of the elite.
The fact that "free market" capitalism always requires introduction by an
authoritarian state should make all honest "Libertarians" ask: How "free"
is the "free market"?
The enclosures were one of the ways that the "land monopoly" was created.
The land monopoly referred to feudal and capitalist property rights and ownership
of land by (among others) the Individualist Anarchists. Instead of an
"occupancy and use" regime advocated by anarchists, the land monopoly
allowed a few to bar the many from the land -- so creating a class of people with
nothing to sell but their labour. While this monopoly is less important these
days in developed nations (few people know how to farm) it was essential as a
means of consolidating capitalism. Given the choice, most people preferred to
become independent farmers rather than wage workers (see
next section). As such, the "land monopoly"
involves more than simply enclosing common land but also enforcing the claims
of landlords to areas of land greater than they can work by their own labour.
Needless to say, the titles of landlords and the state are generally ignored
by supporters of capitalism who tend to concentrate on the enclosure movement
in order to downplay its importance. Little wonder, for it is something of an
embarrassment for them to acknowledge that the creation of capitalism
was somewhat less than "immaculate" -- after all, capitalism is portrayed
as an almost ideal society of freedom. To find out that an idol has
feet of clay and that we are still living with the impact of its
origins is something pro-capitalists must deny. So are the enclosures
a socialist myth? Most claims that it is flow from the work of the
historian J.D. Chambers' famous essay "Enclosures and the Labour Supply
in the Industrial Revolution." [Economic History Review, 2nd series,
no. 5, August 1953] In this essay, Chambers attempts to refute Karl
Marx's account of the enclosures and the role it played in what Marx
called "primitive accumulation."
We cannot be expected to provide an extensive account of the debate that has
raged over this issue (Colin Ward notes that "a later series of scholars
have provided locally detailed evidence that reinforces" the traditional
socialist analysis of enclosure and its impact. [Cotters and Squatters, p. 143]).
All we can do is provide a summary of the work of William Lazonick who presented
an excellent reply to those who claim that the enclosures were an unimportant
historical event (see his "Karl Marx and Enclosures in England." [Review
of Radical Political Economy, no. 6, pp. 1-32]). Here, we draw upon his
subsequent summarisation of his critique provided in his books Competitive
Advantage on the Shop Floor and Business Organisation and the Myth of
the Market Economy.
There are three main claims against the socialist account of the enclosures.
We will cover each in turn.
Firstly, it is often claimed that the enclosures drove the uprooted cottager
and small peasant into industry. However, this was never claimed. As Lazonick
stresses while some economic historians "have attributed to Marx the notion
that, in one fell swoop, the enclosure movement drove the peasants off the soil
and into the factories. Marx did not put forth such a simplistic view of the
rise of a wage-labour force . . . Despite gaps and omission in Marx's historical
analysis, his basic arguments concerning the creation of a landless proletariat
are both important and valid. The transformations of social relations of production
and the emergence of a wage-labour force in the agricultural sector were the
critical preconditions for the Industrial Revolution." [Competitive
Advantage on the Shop Floor, pp. 12-3]
It is correct, as the critics of Marx stress, that the agricultural revolution
associated with the enclosures increased the demand for farm labour as
claimed by Chambers and others. And this is the whole point -- enclosures
created a pool of dispossessed labourers who had to sell their time/liberty to
survive and whether this was to a landlord or an industrialist is irrelevant
(as Marx himself stressed). As such, the account by Chambers, ironically,
"confirms the broad outlines of Marx's arguments" as it implicitly
acknowledges that "over the long run the massive reallocation of access
to land that enclosures entailed resulted in the separation of the mass of
agricultural producers from the means of production." So the "critical
transformation was not the level of agricultural employment before and after
enclosure but the changes in employment relations caused by the reorganisation
of landholdings and the reallocation of access to land." [Op. Cit., p. 29,
pp. 29-30 and p. 30] Thus the key feature of the enclosures was that it created
a supply for farm labour, a supply that had no choice but to work for another.
Once freed from the land, these workers could later move to the towns in search
for better work:
In summary, when the critics argue that enclosures increased the demand for farm
labour they are not refuting Marx but confirming his analysis. This is because
the enclosures had resulted in a transformation in employment relations in
agriculture with the peasants and farmers turned into wage workers for landlords
(i.e., rural capitalists). For if wage labour is the defining characteristic of
capitalism then it matters little if the boss is a farmer or an industrialist.
This means that the "critics, it turns out, have not differed substantially
with Marx on the facts of agricultural transformation. But by ignoring the
historical and theoretical significance of the resultant changes in the social
relations of agricultural production, the critics have missed Marx's
main point." [Competitive Advantage on the Shop Floor, p. 30]
Secondly, it is argued that the number of small farm owners increased,
or at least did not greatly decline, and so the enclosure movement was
unimportant. Again, this misses the point. Small farm owners can still
employ wage workers (i.e. become capitalist farmers as opposed to
"yeomen" -- an independent peasant proprietor). As Lazonick notes, "[i]t
is true that after 1750 some petty proprietors continued to occupy and work
their own land. But in a world of capitalist agriculture, the yeomanry no
longer played an important role in determining the course of capitalist
agriculture. As a social class that could influence the evolution of British
economy society, the yeomanry had disappeared." Moreover, Chambers himself
acknowledged that for the poor without legal rights in land, then enclosure
injured them. For "the majority of the agricultural population . . . had
only customary rights. To argue that these people were not treated unfairly
because they did not possess legally enforceable property rights is irrelevant
to the fact that they were dispossessed by enclosures. Again, Marx's critics
have failed to address the issue of the transformation of access to the means
of production as a precondition for the Industrial Revolution." [Op. Cit.,
p. 32 and p. 31]
Thirdly, it is often claimed that it was population growth, rather than
enclosures, that caused the supply of wage workers. So was population
growth more important than enclosures? Given that enclosure impacted on
the individuals and social customs of the time, it is impossible to separate
the growth in population from the social context in which it happened. As
such, the population argument ignores the question of whether the changes
in society caused by enclosures and the rise of capitalism have an
impact on the observed trends towards earlier marriage and larger
families after 1750. Lazonick argues that "[t]here is reason
to believe that they did." [Op. Cit., p. 33] Overall,
Lazonick notes that "[i]t can even be argued that the changed
social relations of agriculture altered the constraints on early
marriage and incentives to childbearing that contributed to the growth in
population. The key point is that transformations in social relations in
production can influence, and have influenced, the quantity of wage labour
supplied on both agricultural and industrial labour markets. To argue that
population growth created the industrial labour supply is to ignore these
momentous social transformations" associated with the rise of capitalism.
[Business Organisation and the Myth of the Market Economy, p. 273]
In other words, there is good reason to think that the enclosures, far
from being some kind of socialist myth, in fact played a key role in
the development of capitalism. As Lazonick notes, "Chambers misunderstood"
the "argument concerning the 'institutional creation' of a proletarianised
(i.e. landless) workforce. Indeed, Chamber's own evidence and logic tend to
support the Marxian [and anarchist!] argument, when it is properly understood."
[Op. Cit., p. 273]
F.8.1 What social forces lay behind the rise of capitalism?
Capitalist society is a relatively recent development. For Marx, while
markets have existed for millennium "the capitalist era dates from the
sixteenth century." [Capital, vol. 1, p. 876] As Murray Bookchin
pointed out, for a "long era, perhaps spanning more than five centuries,"
capitalism "coexisted with feudal and simple commodity relationships"
in Europe. He argues that this period "simply cannot be treated as
'transitional' without reading back the present into the past." [From
Urbanisation to Cities, p. 179] In other words, capitalism was not
a inevitable outcome of "history" or social evolution.
"In short, the Mercantile System was a system of State-regulated exploitation
through trade which played a highly important rule in the adolescence of
capitalist industry: it was essentially the economic policy of an age of
primitive accumulation." [Op. Cit., p. 209]
F.8.2 What was the social context of the statement "laissez-faire?"
The honeymoon of interests between the early capitalists and autocratic
kings did not last long. "This selfsame monarchy, which for weighty
reasons sought to further the aims of commercial capital and was. . .
itself aided in its development by capital, grew at last into a
crippling obstacle to any further development of European industry."
[Rudolf Rocker, Nationalism and Culture, p. 117]
"The development of production, the vast expansion of commerce, the
immeasurable power assumed by money . . . have guaranteed this supremacy
[of economic power over political power] to the capitalist class which,
no longer content with enjoying the support of the government,
demanded that government arise from its own ranks. A government
which owed its origin to the right of conquest . . . though
subject by existing circumstances to the capitalist class, went on
maintaining a proud and contemptuous attitude towards its now wealthy
former slaves, and had pretensions to independence of domination. That
government was indeed the defender, the property owners' gendarme, but
the kind of gendarmes who think they are somebody, and behave in an
arrogant manner towards the people they have to escort and defend, when
they don't rob or kill them at the next street corner; and the capitalist
class got rid of it . . . and replac[ed] it by a government of its own
choosing, at all times under its control and specifically organised to
defend that class against any possible demands by the disinherited."
[Anarchy, pp. 22-3]
"In the long run, there are no laissez-faire transitions to modern
economic growth. The state has always intervened to create a capitalist
class, and then it has to regulate the capitalist class, and then the
state has to worry about being taken over by the capitalist class,
but the state has always been there." [quoted by Noam Chomsky, Year
501, p. 104]
"Contrary to what liberals and Marxists assert, marketisation of the
economy was not just an evolutionary process, following the expansion of
trade under mercantilism . . . modern [i.e. capitalist] markets did not
evolve out of local markets and/or markets for foreign goods . . . the
nation-state, which was just emerging at the end of the Middle Ages,
played a crucial role creating the conditions for the 'nationalisation'
of the market . . . and . . . by freeing the market from effective social
control." ["The Nation-state and the Market", pp. 37-80
Society and Nature, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 44-45]
F.8.3 What other forms did state intervention in creating capitalism take?
Beyond being a paymaster for new forms of production and social relations
as well as defending the owners' power, the state intervened economically in
other ways as well. As we noted in section B.2.5,
the state played a key role in transforming the law codes of society in a capitalistic
fashion, ignoring custom and common law when it was convenient to do so. Similarly,
the use of tariffs and the granting of monopolies to companies played an important
role in accumulating capital at the expense of working people, as did the
breaking of unions and strikes by force.
That steals the goose from off the common;
But let the greater villain loose,
That steals the common from the goose.
To live without access to land
He would have succeeded
But found that he needed
Food, shelter and somewhere to stand.
"Whereas late against the malice of servants, which were idle, and not willing
to serve after the pestilence, without taking excessive wages, it was ordained
by our lord the king . . . that such manner of servants . . . should be bound
to serve, receiving salary and wages, accustomed in places where they ought to
serve in the twentieth year of the reign of the king that now is, or five or
six years before; and that the same servants refusing to serve in such manner
should be punished by imprisonment of their bodies . . . now forasmuch as it
is given the king to understand in this present parliament, by the petition of
the commonalty, that the said servants having no regard to the said ordinance,
. . to the great damage of the great men, and impoverishing of all the said
commonalty, whereof the said commonalty prayeth remedy: wherefore in the said
parliament, by the assent of the said prelates, earls, barons, and other great
men, and of the same commonalty there assembled, to refrain the malice of the
said servants, be ordained and established the things underwritten."
F.8.4 Aren't the enclosures a socialist myth?
The short answer is no, they are not. While a lot of historical analysis
has been spent in trying to deny the extent and impact of the enclosures,
the simple fact is (in the words of noted historian E.P. Thompson)
enclosure "was a plain enough case of class robbery, played according
to the fair rules of property and law laid down by a parliament of
property-owners and lawyers." [The Making of the English Working Class,
pp. 237-8]
"Critical to the Marxian thesis of the origins of the industrial labour
force is the transformation of the social relations of agriculture and the
creation, in the first instance, of an agricultural wage-labour force that
might eventually, perhaps through market incentives, be drawn into the
industrial labour force." [Business Organisation and the Myth of
the Market Economy, p. 273]