Before continuing, it is useful to quote Alan Haworth when he notes that "[i]n fact, it is surprising how little close attention the concept of freedom receives from libertarian writers. Once again Anarchy, State, and Utopia is a case in point. The word 'freedom' doesn't even appear in the index. The word 'liberty' appears, but only to refer the reader to the 'Wilt Chamberlain' passage. In a supposedly 'libertarian' work, this is more than surprising. It is truly remarkable." [Anti-Libertarianism, p. 95] Why this is the case can be seen from how the right-"libertarian" defines freedom.
In right-"libertarian" and "anarcho"-capitalist ideology, freedom is considered to be a product of property. As Murray Rothbard puts it, "the libertarian defines the concept of 'freedom' or 'liberty'. . .[as a] condition in which a person's ownership rights in his body and his legitimate material property rights are not invaded, are not aggressed against. . . . Freedom and unrestricted property rights go hand in hand." [Op. Cit., p.41]
This definition has some problems, however. In such a society, one cannot (legitimately) do anything with or on another's property if the owner prohibits it. This means that an individual's only guaranteed freedom is determined by the amount of property that he or she owns. This has the consequence that someone with no property has no guaranteed freedom at all (beyond, of course, the freedom not to be murdered or otherwise harmed by the deliberate acts of others). In other words, a distribution of property is a distribution of freedom, as the right-"libertarians" themselves define it. It strikes anarchists as strange that an ideology that claims to be committed to promoting freedom entails the conclusion that some people should be more free than others. Yet this is the logical implication of their view, which raises a serious doubt as to whether "anarcho"-capitalists are actually interested in freedom at all.
Looking at Rothbard's definition of "liberty" quoted above, we can see that freedom is actually no longer considered to be a fundamental, independent concept. Instead, freedom is a derivative of something more fundamental, namely the "legitimate rights" of an individual, which are identified as property rights. In other words, given that "anarcho"-capitalists and right-"libertarians" in general consider the right to property as "absolute," it follows that freedom and property become one and the same. This suggests an alternative name for the right Libertarian, namely "Propertarian." And, needless to say, if we do not accept the right-libertarians' view of what constitutes "legitimate rights," then their claim to be defenders of liberty is weak.
Another important implication of this "liberty as property" concept is that it produces a strangely alienated concept of freedom. Liberty, as we noted, is no longer considered absolute, but a derivative of property -- which has the important consequence that you can "sell" your liberty and still be considered free by the ideology. This concept of liberty is usually termed "self-ownership." But, to state the obvious, I do not "own" myself, as if were an object somehow separable from my subjectivity -- I am myself (see section B.4.2). However, the concept of "self-ownership" is handy for justifying various forms of domination and oppression -- for by agreeing (usually under the force of circumstances, we must note) to certain contracts, an individual can "sell" (or rent out) themselves to others (for example, when workers sell their labour power to capitalists on the "free market"). In effect, "self-ownership" becomes the means of justifying treating people as objects -- ironically, the very thing the concept was created to stop! As anarchist L. Susan Brown notes, "[a]t the moment an individual 'sells' labour power to another, he/she loses self-determination and instead is treated as a subjectless instrument for the fulfilment of another's will." [The Politics of Individualism, p. 4]
Given that workers are paid to obey, you really have to wonder which planet Murray Rothbard was on when he argued that a person's "labour service is alienable, but his will is not" and that he "cannot alienate his will, more particularly his control over his own mind and body." He contrasts private property and self-ownership by arguing that "[a]ll physical property owned by a person is alienable . . . I can give away or sell to another person my shoes, my house, my car, my money, etc. But there are certain vital things which, in natural fact and in the nature of man, are inalienable . . . [his] will and control over his own person are inalienable." [The Ethics of Liberty, p. 40, p. 135 and pp. 134-5] Yet "labour services" are unlike the private possessions Rothbard lists as being alienable. As we argued in section B.1 a person's "labour services" and "will" cannot be divided -- if you sell your labour services, you also have to give control of your body and mind to another person. If a worker does not obey the commands of her employer, she is fired. That Rothbard denied this indicates a total lack of common-sense. Perhaps Rothbard would have argued that as the worker can quit at any time she does not really alienate their will (this seems to be his case against slave contracts -- see section F.2.2). But this ignores the fact that between the signing and breaking of the contract and during work hours (and perhaps outside work hours, if the boss has mandatory drug testing or will fire workers who attend union or anarchist meetings or those who have an "unnatural" sexuality and so on) the worker does alienate his will and body. In the words of Rudolf Rocker, "under the realities of the capitalist economic form . . . there can . . . be no talk of a 'right over one's own person,' for that ends when one is compelled to submit to the economic dictation of another if he does not want to starve." [Anarcho-Syndicalism, p. 10]
Ironically, the rights of property (which are said to flow from an individual's self-ownership of themselves) becomes the means, under capitalism, by which self-ownership of non-property owners is denied. The foundational right (self-ownership) becomes denied by the derivative right (ownership of things). "To treat others and oneself as property," argues L. Susan Brown, "objectifies the human individual, denies the unity of subject and object and is a negation of individual will . . . [and] destroys the very freedom one sought in the first place. The liberal belief in property, both real and in the person, leads not to freedom but to relationships of domination and subordination." [Op. Cit., p. 3] Under capitalism, a lack of property can be just as oppressive as a lack of legal rights because of the relationships of domination and subjection this situation creates. That people "consent" to this hierarchy misses the point. As Alexander Berkman put it:
"The law says your employer does not steal anything from you, because it is done with your consent. You have agreed to work for your boss for certain pay, he to have all that you produce . . ."But did you really consent?
"When the highway man holds his gun to your head, you turn your valuables over to him. You 'consent' all right, but you do so because you cannot help yourself, because you are compelled by his gun.
"Are you not compelled to work for an employer? Your need compels you just as the highwayman's gun. You must live . . . You can't work for yourself . . . The factories, machinery, and tools belong to the employing class, so you must hire yourself out to that class in order to work and live. Whatever you work at, whoever your employer may be, it always comes to the same: you must work for him. You can't help yourself. You are compelled."
[What is Anarchism?, p. 11]
Due to this class monopoly over the means of life, workers (usually) are at a disadvantage in terms of bargaining power -- there are more workers than jobs (see section C.9). Within capitalism there is no equality between owners and the dispossessed, and so property is a source of power. To claim that this power should be "left alone" or is "fair" is "to the anarchists. . . preposterous. Once a State has been established, and most of the country's capital privatised, the threat of physical force is no longer necessary to coerce workers into accepting jobs, even with low pay and poor conditions. To use [right-"libertarian"] Ayn Rand's term, 'initial force' has already taken place, by those who now have capital against those who do not. . . . In other words, if a thief died and willed his 'ill-gotten gain' to his children, would the children have a right to the stolen property? Not legally. So if 'property is theft,' to borrow Proudhon's quip, and the fruit of exploited labour is simply legal theft, then the only factor giving the children of a deceased capitalist a right to inherit the 'booty' is the law, the State. As Bakunin wrote, 'Ghosts should not rule and oppress this world, which belongs only to the living.'" [Jeff Draughn, Between Anarchism and Libertarianism]
Or, in other words, right-Libertarianism fails to "meet the charge that normal operations of the market systematically places an entire class of persons (wage earners) in circumstances that compel them to accept the terms and conditions of labour dictated by those who offer work. While it is true that individuals are formally free to seek better jobs or withhold their labour in the hope of receiving higher wages, in the end their position in the market works against them; they cannot live if they do not find employment. When circumstances regularly bestow a relative disadvantage on one class of persons in their dealings with another class, members of the advantaged class have little need of coercive measures to get what they want." [Stephen L. Newman, Liberalism at Wit's End, p. 130] Eliminating taxation does not end oppression, in other words. As Tolstoy put it:
"in Russia serfdom was only abolished when all the land had been appropriated. When land was granted to the peasants, it was burdened with payments which took the place of the land slavery. In Europe, taxes that kept the people in bondage began to be abolished only when the people had lost their land, were unaccustomed to agricultural work, and . . . quite dependent on the capitalists . . . [They] abolish the taxes that fall on the workers . . . only because the majority of the people are already in the hands of the capitalists. One form of slavery is not abolished until another has already replaced it." [The Slavery of Our Times, p. 32]
So Rothbard's argument (as well as being contradictory) misses the point (and the reality of capitalism). Yes, if we define freedom as "the absence of coercion" then the idea that wage labour does not restrict liberty is unavoidable, but such a definition is useless. This is because it hides structures of power and relations of domination and subordination. As Carole Pateman argues, "the contract in which the worker allegedly sells his labour power is a contract in which, since he cannot be separated from his capacities, he sells command over the use of his body and himself . . . To sell command over the use of oneself for a specified period . . . is to be an unfree labourer. The characteristics of this condition are captured in the term wage slave." [The Sexual Contract, p. 151]
In other words, contracts about property in the person inevitably create subordination. "Anarcho"-capitalism defines this source of unfreedom away, but it still exists and has a major impact on people's liberty. For anarchists freedom is better described as "self-government" or "self-management" -- to be able to govern ones own actions (if alone) or to participate in the determination of join activity (if part of a group). Freedom, to put it another way, is not an abstract legal concept, but the vital concrete possibility for every human being to bring to full development all their powers, capacities, and talents which nature has endowed them. A key aspect of this is to govern one own actions when within associations (self-management). If we look at freedom this way, we see that coercion is condemned but so is hierarchy (and so is capitalism for during working hours people are not free to make their own plans and have a say in what affects them. They are order takers, not free individuals).
It is because anarchists have recognised the authoritarian nature of capitalist firms that they have opposed wage labour and capitalist property rights along with the state. They have desired to replace institutions structured by subordination with institutions constituted by free relationships (based, in other words, on self-management) in all areas of life, including economic organisations. Hence Proudhon's argument that the "workmen's associations . . . are full of hope both as a protest against the wage system, and as an affirmation of reciprocity" and that their importance lies "in their denial of the rule of capitalists, money lenders and governments." [The General Idea of the Revolution, pp. 98-99]
Unlike anarchists, the "anarcho"-capitalist account of freedom allows an individual's freedom to be rented out to another while maintaining that the person is still free. It may seem strange that an ideology proclaiming its support for liberty sees nothing wrong with the alienation and denial of liberty but, in actual fact, it is unsurprising. After all, contract theory is a "theoretical strategy that justifies subjection by presenting it as freedom" and has "turned a subversive proposition [that we are born free and equal] into a defence of civil subjection." Little wonder, then, that contract "creates a relation of subordination" and not of freedom [Carole Pateman, Op. Cit., p. 39 and p. 59] Little wonder, then, that Colin Ward argued that, as an anarchist, he is "by definition, a socialist" and that "[w]orkers' control of industrial production" is "the only approach compatible with anarchism." [Talking Anarchy, p. 25 and p. 26]
Ultimately, any attempt to build an ethical framework starting from the abstract individual (as Rothbard does with his "legitimate rights" method) will result in domination and oppression between people, not freedom. Indeed, Rothbard provides an example of the dangers of idealist philosophy that Bakunin warned about when he argued that while "[m]aterialism denies free will and ends in the establishment of liberty; idealism, in the name of human dignity, proclaims free will, and on the ruins of every liberty founds authority." [God and the State, p. 48] That this is the case with "anarcho"-capitalism can be seen from Rothbard's wholehearted support for wage labour, landlordism and the rules imposed by property owners on those who use, but do not own, their property. Rothbard, basing himself on abstract individualism, cannot help but justify authority over liberty. This, undoubtedly, flows from the right-liberal and conservative roots of his ideology. Individualist anarchist Shawn Wilbar once defined Wikipedia as "the most successful modern experiment in promoting obedience to authority as freedom." However, Wikipedia pales into insignificance compared to the success of liberalism (in its many forms) in doing precisely that. Whether politically or economically, liberalism has always rushed to justify and rationalise the individual subjecting themselves to some form of hierarchy. That "anarcho"-capitalism does this under the name "anarchism" is deeply insulting to anarchists.
Overall, we can see that the logic of the right-"libertarian" definition of "freedom" ends up negating itself because it results in the creation and encouragement of authority, which is an opposite of freedom. For example, as Ayn Rand pointed out, "man has to sustain his life by his own effort, the man who has no right to the product of his effort has no means to sustain his life. The man who produces while others dispose of his product, is a slave." [The Ayn Rand Lexicon: Objectivism from A to Z, pp. 388-9] But, as was shown in section C.2, capitalism is based on, as Proudhon put it, workers working "for an entrepreneur who pays them and keeps their products," and so is a form of theft. Thus, by "libertarian" capitalism's own logic, capitalism is based not on freedom, but on (wage) slavery; for interest, profit and rent are derived from a worker's unpaid labour, i.e. "others dispose of his [sic] product."
Thus it is debatable that a right-"libertarian" or "anarcho" capitalist society would have less unfreedom or authoritarianism in it than "actually existing" capitalism. In contrast to anarchism, "anarcho"-capitalism, with its narrow definitions, restricts freedom to only a few areas of social life and ignores domination and authority beyond those aspects. As Peter Marshall points out, their "definition of freedom is entirely negative. It calls for the absence of coercion but cannot guarantee the positive freedom of individual autonomy and independence." [Demanding the Impossible, p. 564] By confining freedom to such a narrow range of human action, "anarcho"-capitalism is clearly not a form of anarchism. Real anarchists support freedom in every aspect of an individual's life.
In short, as French anarchist Elisee Reclus put it there is "an abyss
between two kinds of society," one of which is "constituted freely by
men of good will, based on a consideration of their common interests" and
another which "accepts the existence of either temporary or permanent masters
to whom [its members] owe obedience." [quoted by Clark and Martin,
Anarchy, Geography, Modernity, p. 62] In other words, when choosing
between anarchism and capitalism, "anarcho"-capitalists pick the latter and
call it the former.
This can be seen from Austrian Economist W. Duncan Reekie's defence of
wage labour. While referring to "intra-firm labour markets" as "hierarchies",
Reekie (in his best ex cathedra tone) states that "[t]here is nothing
authoritarian, dictatorial or exploitative in the relationship. Employees
order employers to pay them amounts specified in the hiring contract just
as much as employers order employees to abide by the terms of the contract."
[Markets, Entrepreneurs and Liberty, p. 136 and p. 137]. Given that "the
terms of contract" involve the worker agreeing to obey the employers orders
and that they will be fired if they do not, its pretty clear that the
ordering that goes on in the "intra-firm labour market" is decidedly one
way. Bosses have the power, workers are paid to obey. And this begs the
question: if the employment contract creates a free worker, why must
she abandon her liberty during work hours?
Reekie actually recognises this lack of freedom in a "round about" way
when he notes that "employees in a firm at any level in the hierarchy can
exercise an entrepreneurial role. The area within which that role can be
carried out increases the more authority the employee has." [Op. Cit.,
p. 142] Which means workers are subject to control from above which
restricts the activities they are allowed to do and so they are not
free to act, make decisions, participate in the plans of the organisation,
to create the future and so forth within working hours. And it is strange
that while recognising the firm as a hierarchy, Reekie tries to deny that
it is authoritarian or dictatorial -- as if you could have a
hierarchy without authoritarian structures or an unelected person in
authority who is not a dictator. His confusion is shared by Austrian guru
Ludwig von Mises, who asserted that the "entrepreneur and capitalist are not
irresponsible autocrats" because they are "unconditionally subject to
the sovereignty of the consumer" while, on the next page, admitting
there was a "managerial hierarchy" which contains "the average
subordinate employee." [Human Action, p. 809 and p. 810] It does not
enter his mind that the capitalist may be subject to some consumer control
while being an autocrat to their subordinated employees. Again, we find the
right-"libertarian" acknowledging that the capitalist managerial structure is
a hierarchy and workers are subordinated while denying it is autocratic to the
workers! Thus we have "free" workers within a relationship distinctly
lacking freedom -- a strange paradox. Indeed, if your personal life
were as closely monitored and regulated as the work life of millions of people across
the world, you would rightly consider it the worse form of oppression and tyranny.
Somewhat ironically, right-wing liberal and "free market" economist Milton
Friedman contrasted "central planning involving the use of coercion -- the
technique of the army or the modern totalitarian state" with "voluntary
co-operation between individuals -- the technique of the marketplace" as
two distinct ways of co-ordinating the economic activity of large groups
("millions") of people. [Capitalism and Freedom, p. 13] However,
this misses the key issue of the internal nature of the company. As
right-"libertarians" themselves note, the internal structure of a capitalist
company is hierarchical. Indeed, the capitalist company is a form of
central planning and so shares the same "technique" as the army. As Peter
Drucker noted in his history of General Motors, "[t]here is a remarkably
close parallel between General Motors' scheme of organisation and those of the
two institutions most renowned for administrative efficiency: that of the
Catholic Church and that of the modern army." [quoted by David Engler,
Apostles of Greed, p. 66] Thus capitalism is marked by a series of
totalitarian organisations. Dictatorship does not change much -- nor does it
become less fascistic -- when discussing economic structures rather than
political ones. To state the obvious, "the employment contract (like the
marriage contract) is not an exchange; both contracts create social relations
that endure over time - social relations of subordination." [Carole Pateman,
The Sexual Contract, p. 148]
Perhaps Reekie (like most right-"libertarians") will maintain that workers
voluntarily agree ("consent") to be subject to the bosses dictatorship (he
writes that "each will only enter into the contractual agreement known as
a firm if each believes he will be better off thereby. The firm is simply
another example of mutually beneficial exchange." [Op. Cit., p. 137]).
However, this does not stop the relationship being authoritarian or
dictatorial (and so exploitative as it is highly unlikely that those
at the top will not abuse their power). Representing employment relations as
voluntary agreement simply mystifies the existence and exercise of power
within the organisation so created.
As we argue further in the section F.3, in a capitalist
society workers have the option of finding a job or facing abject poverty and/or
starvation. Little wonder, then, that people "voluntarily" sell their labour and
"consent" to authoritarian structures! They have little option to do otherwise.
So, within the labour market workers can and do seek
out the best working conditions possible, but that does not mean that
the final contract agreed is "freely" accepted and not due to the
force of circumstances, that both parties have equal bargaining power
when drawing up the contract or that the freedom of both parties is
ensured.
Which means to argue (as right-"libertarians" do) that freedom cannot be
restricted by wage labour because people enter into relationships they
consider will lead to improvements over their initial situation totally
misses the point. As the initial situation is not considered relevant,
their argument fails. After all, agreeing to work in a sweatshop 14 hours
a day is an improvement over starving to death -- but it does not
mean that those who so agree are free when working there or actually
want to be there. They are not and it is the circumstances, created
and enforced by the law (i.e., the state), that have ensured that they "consent"
to such a regime (given the chance, they would desire to change that regime
but cannot as this would violate their bosses property rights and they would
be repressed for trying).
So the right-wing "libertarian" right is interested only in a narrow concept
of freedom (rather than in freedom or liberty as such). This can be seen
in the argument of Ayn Rand that "Freedom, in a political context,
means freedom from government coercion. It does not mean freedom from
the landlord, or freedom from the employer, or freedom from the laws of nature
which do not provide men with automatic prosperity. It means freedom from
the coercive power of the state -- and nothing else!" [Capitalism: The
Unknown Ideal, p. 192] By arguing in this way, right-"libertarians" ignore
the vast number of authoritarian social relationships that exist in capitalist
society and, as Rand does here, imply that these social relationships are like
"the laws of nature." However, if one looks at the world without
prejudice but with an eye to maximising freedom, the major coercive institutions
are the state and capitalist social relationships (and the latter relies
on the former). It should also be noted that, unlike gravity, the power of the
landlord and boss depends on the use of force -- gravity does not need policemen
to make things fall!
The right "libertarian," then, far from being a defender of freedom, is
in fact a keen defender of certain forms of authority. As Kropotkin argued
against a forerunner of right-"libertarianism":
To defend the "freedom" of property owners is to defend authority and
privilege -- in other words, statism. So, in considering the concept of
liberty as "freedom from," it is clear that by defending private property
(as opposed to possession) the "anarcho"-capitalist is defending the power
and authority of property owners to govern those who use "their" property.
And also, we must note, defending all the petty tyrannies that make the
work lives of so many people frustrating, stressful and unrewarding.
Anarchism, by definition, is in favour of organisations and social
relationships which are non-hierarchical and non-authoritarian. Otherwise,
some people are more free than others. Failing to attack hierarchy leads
to massive contradiction. For example, since the British Army is a volunteer
one, it is an "anarchist" organisation! Ironically, it can also allow
a state to appear "libertarian" as that, too, can be considered voluntary
arrangement as long as it allows its subjects to emigrate freely. So
equating freedom with (capitalist) property rights does not protect
freedom, in fact it actively denies it. This lack of freedom is only
inevitable as long as we accept capitalist private property rights. If
we reject them, we can try and create a world based on freedom in all
aspects of life, rather than just in a few.
This can be seen from "anarcho"-capitalist Walter Block, who, like Nozick,
supports voluntary slavery. As he puts it, "if I own something, I can sell
it (and should be allowed by law to do so). If I can't sell, then, and to
that extent, I really don't own it." Thus agreeing to sell yourself for
a lifetime "is a bona fide contract" which, if "abrogated, theft
occurs." He critiques those other right-wing "libertarians" (like Murray
Rothbard) who oppose voluntary slavery as being inconsistent to their principles.
Block, in his words, seeks to make "a tiny adjustment" which "strengthens
libertarianism by making it more internally consistent." He argues
that his position shows "that contract, predicated on private property [can]
reach to the furthest realms of human interaction, even to voluntary
slave contracts." ["Towards a Libertarian Theory of Inalienability: A
Critique of Rothbard, Barnett, Smith, Kinsella, Gordon, and Epstein,"
pp. 39-85, Journal of Libertarian Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, p. 44,
p. 48, p. 82 and p. 46]
So the logic is simple, you cannot really own something unless you can sell
it. Self-ownership is one of the cornerstones of laissez-faire capitalist
ideology. Therefore, since you own yourself you can sell yourself.
This defence of slavery should not come as a surprise to any one
familiar with classical liberalism. An elitist ideology, its main rationale
is to defend the liberty and power of property owners and justify unfree
social relationships (such as government and wage labour) in terms of "consent."
Nozick and Block just takes it to its logical conclusion. This is because
his position is not new but, as with so many other right-"libertarian" ones,
can be found in John Locke's work. The key difference is that Locke refused
the term "slavery" and favoured "drudgery" as, for him,
slavery mean a relationship "between a lawful conqueror and a captive"
where the former has the power of life and death over the latter. Once
a "compact" is agreed between them, "an agreement for a
limited power on the one side, and obedience on the other . . .
slavery ceases." As long as the master could not kill the slave, then
it was "drudgery." Like Nozick, he acknowledges that "men did sell
themselves; but, it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery:
for, it is evident, the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary,
despotical power: for the master could not have power to kill him, at
any time, whom, at a certain time, he was obliged to let go free out
of his service." [Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Section 24]
In other words, voluntary slavery was fine but just call it something else.
Not that Locke was bothered by involuntary slavery. He was heavily
involved in the slave trade. He owned shares in the "Royal Africa
Company" which carried on the slave trade for England, making a
profit when he sold them. He also held a significant share in another
slave company, the "Bahama Adventurers." In the "Second Treatise",
Locke justified slavery in terms of "Captives taken in a just war,"
a war waged against aggressors. [Section 85] That, of course, had nothing
to do with the actual slavery Locke profited from (slave raids
were common, for example). Nor did his "liberal" principles stop him
suggesting a constitution that would ensure that "every freeman of
Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his Negro slaves."
The constitution itself was typically autocratic and hierarchical, designed
explicitly to "avoid erecting a numerous democracy." [The Works of
John Locke, vol. X, p. 196]
So the notion of contractual slavery has a long history within right-wing
liberalism, although most refuse to call it by that name. It is of course
simply embarrassment that stops many right-"libertarians" calling a spade
a spade. They incorrectly assume that slavery has to be involuntary. In fact,
historically, voluntary slave contracts have been common (David Ellerman's
Property and Contract in Economics has an excellent overview). Any
new form of voluntary slavery would be a "civilised" form of slavery and
could occur when an individual would "agree" to sell their lifetime's
labour to another (as when a starving worker would "agree" to become a
slave in return for food). In addition, the contract would be able to be
broken under certain conditions (perhaps in return for breaking the contract,
the former slave would have pay damages to his or her master for the labour
their master would lose -- a sizeable amount no doubt and such a payment
could result in debt slavery, which is the most common form of "civilised"
slavery. Such damages may be agreed in the contract as a "performance bond"
or "conditional exchange."
In summary, right-"libertarians" are talking about "civilised" slavery (or,
in other words, civil slavery) and not forced slavery. While some may have
reservations about calling it slavery, they agree with the basic concept
that since people own themselves they can sell themselves, that is sell
their labour for a lifetime rather than piecemeal.
We must stress that this is no academic debate. "Voluntary" slavery has
been a problem in many societies and still exists in many countries today
(particularly third world ones where bonded labour -- i.e. where debt is
used to enslave people -- is the most common form). With the rise of sweat
shops and child labour in many "developed" countries such as the USA,
"voluntary" slavery (perhaps via debt and bonded labour) may become
common in all parts of the world -- an ironic (if not surprising) result
of "freeing" the market and being indifferent to the actual freedom of
those within it.
Some right-"libertarians" are obviously uneasy with the logical conclusion
of their definition of freedom. Murray Rothbard, for example, stressed the
"unenforceability, in libertarian theory, of voluntary slave contracts."
Of course, other "libertarian" theorists claim the exact opposite,
so "libertarian theory" makes no such claim, but never mind! Essentially,
his objection revolves around the assertion that a person "cannot, in nature,
sell himself into slavery and have this sale enforced -- for this would mean
that his future will over his own body was being surrendered in advance"
and that if a "labourer remains totally subservient to his master's will
voluntarily, he is not yet a slave since his submission is voluntary."
However, as we noted in section F.2, Rothbard emphasis
on quitting fails to recognise the actual denial of will and control over ones
own body that is explicit in wage labour. It is this failure that pro-slave
contract "libertarians" stress -- they consider the slave contract as an
extended wage contract. Moreover, a modern slave contract would likely take
the form of a "performance bond," on which Rothbard laments about its
"unfortunate suppression" by the state. In such a system, the slave
could agree to perform X years labour or pay their master substantial damages
if they fail to do so. It is the threat of damages that enforces the contract
and such a "contract" Rothbard does agree is enforceable. Another means of
creating slave contracts would be "conditional exchange" which
Rothbard also supports. As for debt bondage, that too, seems acceptable. He
surreally notes that paying damages and debts in such contracts is fine as
"money, of course, is alienable" and so forgets that it needs
to be earned by labour which, he asserts, is not alienable! [The
Ethics of Liberty, pp. 134-135, p. 40, pp. 136-9, p. 141 and p. 138]
It should be noted that the slavery contract cannot be null and void because it
is unenforceable, as Rothbard suggests. This is because the doctrine of specific
performance applies to all contracts, not just to labour contracts. This is because
all contracts specify some future performance. In the case of the lifetime
labour contract, then it can be broken as long as the slave pays any appropriate
damages. As Rothbard puts it elsewhere, "if A has agreed to work for life for B
in exchange for 10,000 grams of gold, he will have to return the proportionate
amount of property if he terminates the arrangement and ceases to work." [Man,
Economy, and State, vol. I , p. 441] This is understandable, as the law
generally allows material damages for breached contracts, as does Rothbard in his
support for the "performance bond" and "conditional exchange." Needless
to say, having to pay such damages (either as a lump sum or over a period of time)
could turn the worker into the most common type of modern slave, the debt-slave.
And it is interesting to note that even Murray Rothbard is not against
the selling of humans. He argued that children are the property of their
parents who can (bar actually murdering them by violence) do whatever
they please with them, even sell them on a "flourishing free child market."
[The Ethics of Liberty, p. 102] Combined with a whole hearted support
for child labour (after all, the child can leave its parents if it objects
to working for them) such a "free child market" could easily become a
"child slave market" -- with entrepreneurs making a healthy profit selling
infants and children or their labour to capitalists (as did occur in 19th
century Britain). Unsurprisingly, Rothbard ignores the possible nasty aspects
of such a market in human flesh (such as children being sold to work in
factories, homes and brothels). But this is besides the point.
Of course, this theoretical justification for slavery at the heart of an
ideology calling itself "libertarianism" is hard for many right-"libertarians"
to accept and so they argue that such contracts would be very hard to enforce.
This attempt to get out of the contradiction fails simply because it ignores
the nature of the capitalist market. If there is a demand for slave contracts
to be enforced, then companies will develop to provide that "service" (and it
would be interesting to see how two "protection" firms, one defending slave
contracts and another not, could compromise and reach a peaceful agreement
over whether slave contracts were valid). Thus we could see a so-called
"free" society producing companies whose specific purpose was to hunt down
escaped slaves (i.e. individuals in slave contracts who have not paid
damages to their owners for freedom). Of course, perhaps Rothbard would
claim that such slave contracts would be "outlawed" under his "general
libertarian law code" but this is a denial of market "freedom". If slave
contracts are "banned" then surely this is paternalism, stopping
individuals from contracting out their "labour services" to whom and
however long they "desire". You cannot have it both ways.
So, ironically, an ideology proclaiming itself to support "liberty" ends
up justifying and defending slavery. Indeed, for the right-"libertarian" the
slave contract is an exemplification, not the denial, of the individual's
liberty! How is this possible? How can slavery be supported as an expression
of liberty? Simple, right-"libertarian" support for slavery is a symptom of
a deeper authoritarianism, namely their uncritical acceptance of contract
theory. The central claim of contract theory is that contract is the means
to secure and enhance individual freedom. Slavery is the antithesis to freedom
and so, in theory, contract and slavery must be mutually exclusive. However,
as indicated above, some contract theorists (past and present) have included
slave contracts among legitimate contracts. This suggests that contract
theory cannot provide the theoretical support needed to secure and enhance
individual freedom.
As Carole Pateman argues, "contract theory is primarily about a way of
creating social relations constituted by subordination, not about exchange."
Rather than undermining subordination, contract theorists justify modern
subjection -- "contract doctrine has proclaimed that subjection to a
master -- a boss, a husband -- is freedom." [The Sexual Contract, p. 40
and p. 146] The question central to contract theory (and so right-Libertarianism) is
not "are people free" (as one would expect) but "are people free to
subordinate themselves in any manner they please." A radically different
question and one only fitting to someone who does not know what liberty means.
Anarchists argue that not all contracts are legitimate and no free individual
can make a contract that denies his or her own freedom. If an individual
is able to express themselves by making free agreements then those free
agreements must also be based upon freedom internally as well. Any agreement
that creates domination or hierarchy negates the assumptions underlying the
agreement and makes itself null and void. In other words, voluntary government
is still government and a defining characteristic of an anarchy must be,
surely, "no government" and "no rulers."
This is most easily seen in the extreme case of the slave contract. John
Stuart Mill stated that such a contract would be "null and void." He argued
that an individual may voluntarily choose to enter such a contract but
in so doing "he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it
beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the
very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of
himself. . .The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be
free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his
freedom." He adds that "these reasons, the force of which is so
conspicuous in this particular case, are evidently of far wider
application." [quoted by Pateman, Op. Cit., pp. 171-2]
And it is such an application that defenders of capitalism fear (Mill did
in fact apply these reasons wider and unsurprisingly became a supporter of
a market syndicalist form of socialism). If we reject slave contracts as
illegitimate then, logically, we must also reject all contracts that
express qualities similar to slavery (i.e. deny freedom) including wage
slavery. Given that, as David Ellerman points out, "the voluntary slave . . .
and the employee cannot in fact take their will out of their intentional actions
so that they could be 'employed' by the master or employer" we are left
with "the rather implausible assertion that a person can vacate his or her
will for eight or so hours a day for weeks, months, or years on end but cannot
do so for a working lifetime." [Property and Contract in Economics,
p. 58] This is Rothbard's position.
The implications of supporting voluntary slavery is quite devastating
for all forms of right-wing "libertarianism." This was proven by Ellerman
when he wrote an extremely robust defence of it under the pseudonym
"J. Philmore" called The Libertarian Case for Slavery (first published
in The Philosophical Forum, xiv, 1982). This classic rebuttal takes the
form of "proof by contradiction" (or reductio ad absurdum) whereby he
takes the arguments of right-libertarianism to their logical end and shows how
they reach the memorably conclusion that the "time has come for liberal
economic and political thinkers to stop dodging this issue and to
critically re-examine their shared prejudices about certain voluntary
social institutions . . . this critical process will inexorably drive
liberalism to its only logical conclusion: libertarianism that finally
lays the true moral foundation for economic and political slavery."
Ellerman shows how, from a right-"libertarian" perspective there is a
"fundamental contradiction" in a modern liberal society for the state
to prohibit slave contracts. He notes that there "seems to be a basic
shared prejudice of liberalism that slavery is inherently involuntary,
so the issue of genuinely voluntary slavery has received little scrutiny.
The perfectly valid liberal argument that involuntary slavery is inherently
unjust is thus taken to include voluntary slavery (in which case, the
argument, by definition, does not apply). This has resulted in an
abridgement of the freedom of contract in modern liberal society." Thus it
is possible to argue for a "civilised form of contractual slavery."
["J. Philmore,", Op. Cit.]
So accurate and logical was Ellerman's article that many of its readers
were convinced it was written by a right-"libertarian" (including, we
have to say, us!). One such writer was Carole Pateman, who correctly noted
that "[t]here is a nice historical irony here. In the American South,
slaves were emancipated and turned into wage labourers, and now American
contractarians argue that all workers should have the opportunity to turn
themselves into civil slaves." [Op. Cit., p. 63]).
The aim of Ellerman's article was to show the problems that employment (wage
labour) presents for the concept of self-government and how contract need
not result in social relationships based on freedom. As "Philmore" put it,
"[a]ny thorough and decisive critique of voluntary slavery or constitutional
non-democratic government would carry over to the employment contract --
which is the voluntary contractual basis for the free-market
free-enterprise system. Such a critique would thus be a reductio ad
absurdum." As "contractual slavery" is an "extension of the employer-employee
contract," he shows that the difference between wage labour and slavery is
the time scale rather than the principle or social relationships involved.
[Op. Cit.] This explains why the early workers' movement called
capitalism "wage slavery" and why anarchists still do. It
exposes the unfree nature of capitalism and the poverty of its vision of
freedom. While it is possible to present wage labour as "freedom" due to
its "consensual" nature, it becomes much harder to do so when talking about
slavery or dictatorship (and let us not forget that Nozick also had no problem
with autocracy -- see section B.4). Then the
contradictions are exposed for all to see and be horrified by.
All this does not mean that we must reject free agreement. Far from it! Free
agreement is essential for a society based upon individual dignity and
liberty. There are a variety of forms of free agreement and anarchists
support those based upon co-operation and self-management (i.e. individuals
working together as equals). Anarchists desire to create relationships
which reflect (and so express) the liberty that is the basis of free
agreement. Capitalism creates relationships that deny liberty. The opposition
between autonomy and subjection can only be maintained by modifying or
rejecting contract theory, something that capitalism cannot do and so the
right-wing "libertarian" rejects autonomy in favour of subjection (and so
rejects socialism in favour of capitalism).
So the real contrast between genuine libertarians and right-"libertarians" is
best expressed in their respective opinions on slavery. Anarchism is based
upon the individual whose individuality depends upon the maintenance of
free relationships with other individuals. If individuals deny their
capacities for self-government through a contract the individuals bring
about a qualitative change in their relationship to others -- freedom is
turned into mastery and subordination. For the anarchist, slavery is thus
the paradigm of what freedom is not, instead of an exemplification of
what it is (as right-"libertarians" state). As Proudhon argued:
From the basic insight that slavery is the opposite of freedom, the anarchist
rejection of authoritarian social relations quickly follows:
The right-"libertarian" support for slave contracts (and wage slavery)
indicates that their ideology has little to do with liberty and far more
to do with justifying property and the oppression and exploitation it
produces. Their theoretical support for permanent and temporary voluntary
slavery and autocracy indicates a deeper authoritarianism which negates
their claims to be libertarians.
F.2.1 How does private property affect freedom?
The right-"libertarian" either does not acknowledge or dismisses as irrelevant
the fact that the (absolute) right of private property may lead to extensive
control by property owners over those who use, but do not own, property (such
as workers and tenants). Thus a free-market capitalist system leads to a
very selective and class-based protection of "rights" and "freedoms."
For example, under capitalism, the "freedom" of employers inevitably
conflicts with the "freedom" of employees. When stockholders or their
managers exercise their "freedom of enterprise" to decide how their
company will operate, they violate their employee's right to decide
how their labouring capacities will be utilised and so under capitalism
the "property rights" of employers will conflict with and restrict the
"human right" of employees to manage themselves. Capitalism allows the
right of self-management only to the few, not to all. Or, alternatively,
capitalism does not recognise certain human rights as universal
which anarchism does.
"The modern Individualism initiated by Herbert
Spencer is, like the critical theory of Proudhon, a powerful indictment
against the dangers and wrongs of government, but its practical solution
of the social problem is miserable -- so miserable as to lead us to
inquire if the talk of 'No force' be merely an excuse for supporting
landlord and capitalist domination." [Act For Yourselves, p. 98]
F.2.2 Do "libertarian"-capitalists support slavery?
Yes. It may come as a surprise to many people, but right-"Libertarianism" is
one of the few political theories that justifies slavery. For example, Robert
Nozick asks whether "a free system would allow [the individual] to sell
himself into slavery" and he answers "I believe that it would."
[Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 371] While some right-"libertarians" do
not agree with Nozick, there is no logical basis in their ideology for such
disagreement.
"If I were asked to answer the following question: What is slavery? and
I should answer in one word, It is murder, my meaning would be understood
at once. No extended argument would be required to show that the power to
take from a man his thought, his will, his personality, is a power of life
and death; and that to enslave a man is to kill him." [What is Property?,
p. 37]
In contrast, the right-"libertarian" effectively argues that "I support slavery
because I believe in liberty." It is a sad reflection of the ethical and
intellectual bankruptcy of our society that such an "argument" is actually
proposed by some people under the name of liberty. The concept of "slavery as
freedom" is far too Orwellian to warrant a critique -- we will leave it up to
right-"libertarians" to corrupt our language and ethical standards with an attempt
to prove it.
"Liberty is inviolable. I can neither sell nor alienate my liberty; every
contract, every condition of a contract, which has in view the alienation or
suspension of liberty, is null: the slave, when he plants his foot upon the
soil of liberty, at that moment becomes a free man . . . Liberty is the original
condition of man; to renounce liberty is to renounce the nature of man: after
that, how could we perform the acts of man?" [P.J. Proudhon, Op. Cit., p. 67]
The employment contract (i.e. wage slavery) abrogates liberty. It is based
upon inequality of power and "exploitation is a consequence of the fact
that the sale of labour power entails the worker's subordination." [Carole
Pateman, Op. Cit., p. 149] Hence Proudhon's support for self-management
and opposition to capitalism -- any relationship that resembles slavery is
illegitimate and no contract that creates a relationship of subordination is
valid. Thus in a truly anarchistic society, slave contracts would be unenforceable
-- people in a truly free (i.e. non-capitalist) society would never
tolerate such a horrible institution or consider it a valid agreement. If
someone was silly enough to sign such a contract, they would simply have to
say they now rejected it in order to be free -- such contracts are
made to be broken and without the force of a law system (and private
defence firms) to back it up, such contracts will stay broken.