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"Today the North American Free Trade Agreement begins, which is nothing more than a death sentence to the Indigenous ethnicities of Mexico, which are perfectly dispensable in the modernization program of Salinas de Gortari."" -- Subcomandante Marcos, military commander and chief spokesman for the EZLN, January 1, 1994(1)
On January 1, 1994, the world awoke to news of a rebellion in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas. To many the explosion came as a complete surprise.(2) Had not the fall of the Soviet Union, the decline of Cuba, the Sandinista electoral losses, and the concomitant success of global capitalism made guerrilla warfare in Latin America a thing of the past? Of all the countries in Latin America, many would have said that Mexico was the least likely to fall prey to the old problems of internal insurgency and "subversion"". Most experts considered Mexico a "middle power"" at the international level -- a modest associate of the United States, that would cast off its Third World status once and for all in 1994 when it entered its first year of the North American Free Trade Agreement.(3)
Early reports about the rebels, who called themselves the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (Zapatista Army of National Liberation -- EZLN), tried to paint them as old-fashioned Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries, who were apparently unaware of the failure and subsequent fall of socialism.(4) According to these articles, the EZLN's rhetoric and actions appeared to echo the leftist guerrilla movements in Central America of the 1980s.(5) But when the dust began to settle and a stream of communiques and pronouncements from the Zapatistas themselves became available to the Mexican and international press, a very different picture emerged. Some members of the press and the intellectual community began speaking of the Zapatistas and their uprising as "postmodern"".
Debates over the meaning or correctness of the new appellation and the relative merit of postmodern analysis flourished, particularly amongst the intellectual left. Some writers, like Daniel Nugent, found fault with the label --
It is difficult to see how a rebel army of peasants aware of itself as the product of five hundred years of struggle, that quotes from the Mexican constitution to legitimate its demand that the president of Mexico immediately leave office, that additionally demands work, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, liberty, democracy, justice, and peace for the people of Mexico, can be called a "postmodern political movement.""(6)
Others still maintained that the EZLN represented something very new --
. . . .No serious political analyst of the right or left is calling the Zapatista movement Marxist or socialist, simply because these labels just don't fit. The important fact is that the EZLN is searching for a new path that takes us beyond traditional politics.(7) (emphasis added)
Setting aside the debates over the utility of postmodern analysis, it is my contention that the EZLN does indeed represent a distinctly new type of national liberation movement -- one that has woven together postmodern sensibilities and tactics with traditional elements of Zapatismo, nationalism, and socialism.
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the context of the Zapatista uprising and to outline the novel elements of the EZLN's philosophy and practice. First, it will be helpful to review the history of Chiapas, briefly touching on the national and global context. Next an exploration of the origins of the EZLN and how it differs both in strategy and tactics from traditional guerrilla groups is in order. It will then be useful to consider the general features of postmodernist thought and postmodernist political activity. Having thus established a proper framework, a presentation of the EZLN's demands and activities will make evident the postmodern qualities of the movement. Finally, the conclusion will raise some questions regarding the results of the Chiapas uprising, the future relevance of the EZLN's model for other revolutionary movements, and the future of the Mexican political system.
"Chiapas loses blood through many veins. Through oil and gas ducts, electric lines, railways, through bank accounts, trucks, vans, boats, planes, through clandestine paths, gaps, and forest trails This land continues to pay tribute to the imperialists. . . .The fee that capitalism imposes on the Southeastern part of this country oozes, as it has since from the beginning, blood and mud."" -- Subcomandante Marcos, August 1992 (8)
The people of Chiapas, historically one of the poorest states in Mexico, had noted some moderate improvements in their living conditions as a result of the land reforms begun by President Lazaro Cardenas in the mid- to late 1930s. By 1950, Indian communities in Chiapas had gained control of over more than half of the land, forming many ejidos, (communal farms) -- but not surprisingly, the best lands remained under the control of an elite group of prosperous farmers, plantation owners, and nouveaux riches ranchers (9) that served as the primary base of support for the ruling state party, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional -- Institutional Revolutionary Party). Inequality and class divisions, primarily based on disparities in land ownership and on differential access to the political system, developed and grew throughout the rest of the decade. A group of caciques, powerful local rulers and intermediaries, aligned themselves with the PRI, manipulated the bureaucracies, and turned local politics to their advantage.(10) The vast majority of the population, without much hope for improving their lot, remained at the periphery of the limited development occurring in Chiapas.
By the 1960s the combined effects of the Cuban Revolution and the rise of liberation theology throughout Latin America resulted in the politicization of previously marginalized peoples. Student radicals, would-be guerrillas, and activist priests began speaking for the poor and encouraged the poor to speak for themselves. Particularly important in Chiapas was the Catholic church, led by Bishop Don Samuel Ruiz Garcia, who initiated irreversible changes in Indian communities, inspiring them with self-respect and pride in their culture.(11) Organizing at the grass-roots level, involving themselves in consciousness-raising, and believing that knowing God meant working to overcome poverty, reformist priests and lay workers sought on-going dialogues with the poor.(12) The activist Bishop and his church workers,
. . . .Gave them [the indigenous peoples] hope for a brighter future and taught them to love their neighbors and to have faith in their own ability to liberate themselves from their misery -- views necessary to unite a fragmented and disparate people and to build a sense of collective security and community.(13)
For Chiapas the 1970s was an era of economic boom and profound transformation. The beef cattle industry, which had destroyed much of the region's rainforest, and export crops such as coffee, bananas, and cotton, were the driving forces behind an economy that grew at an annual rate of 10.5%.(14) Again, the benefits of economic expansion were uneven. Another locus of capitalist development was the petroleum industry in northeastern Chiapas which drew thousands of peasants into menial construction, maintenance, and transportation jobs.(15) While the oil boom brought prosperity to some, it also gave many Chiapanecos their first extensive contact with the outside world and with capitalist socioeconomic relations. Perhaps seeing an opportunity, student activists and others began moving into Chiapas, organizing peasant groups and cooperatives.(16)
The combined legacies of liberation theology and political organizing led to an explosion of revolts, protests, and land seizures during the 1970s and early 1980s; violent confrontations over land became commonplace.(17) Much of the population was no longer willing to tolerate what they perceived as continuing injustice and exploitation. Indigenous peoples became more aware of the need to defend themselves and their culture from the attacks of wealthy ranchers and the forward march of an economic system that perpetually assigned them the worst roles. Scores of people died violently as local landowners, government troops and guardias blancas ("white guards"" -- hired gunmen of the ranchers) sought to end land occupations and break up public demonstrations.(18)
By early 1983, the situation in Chiapas had deteriorated to the point that President Miguel de la Madrid made an emergency trip to the state, and appointed General Absalon Castellanos Dominguez governor.(19) The new governor launched a land reform program that granted large plots of land to ejidos and Indian communities, but still favored groups and organizations that had been acquiescent or aligned with the PRI.(20) While temporarily ameliorating conflict, class divisions and inequalities became more profound.
The neo-liberal modernization programs of President Salinas virtually eliminated the reformist policies of previous presidents and intensified class divisions, poverty, and conflict.(21) The results for the people of Chiapas have been devastating. Out of a population of 3.5 million, 30.1% are illiterate and 62% did not complete their primary education.(22) More than 35% of the state's dwellings lack electricity or drainage, while 51% have earthen floors and 70% are overcrowded.(23) The transportation system is minimal -- only two-thirds of municipalities have paved or partially-paved roads and twelve thousand rural communities are reachable only by mountain trails.(24) Only two railroad lines exist, both of which date from the beginning of the century.(25) There is only one doctor for every 1,500 residents (half the national average), and only 0.3 hospital beds per one thousand inhabitants (one-third the national level).(26) While 40% receive less than the daily minimum wage (11 pesos, roughly $3.00 per day), 19% of the working population receives no income.(27) Previously, subsistence farmers had boosted their incomes by hiring themselves out as day-workers on large estates, but unemployment has increased dramatically since the 1980s when large coffee farmers began employing Guatemalan refugees at substantially lower wages.(28) The indigenous population has virtually no access to markets, credit, technical support services, tractors, education, clean water or health services.(29) The situation tends to be even worse in the jungle regions, where years of relative isolation, and linguistic and cultural barriers have left their mark.
At the same time Chiapas is one of the richest states in Mexico in terms of natural resources, including oil, gas, timber, and hydroelectric power.(30) Its three major dams produce 55% of the nation's electricity; oil and natural gas production account respectively for 21% and 47% of national production.(31) Chiapas is also the largest coffee producer in the country and second largest producer of corn.(32)
Having already endured the results of "reforms"" and "free trade,"" many Chiapanecos view NAFTA as yet another assault. Many expect the treaty to contribute to rural misery, reverse years of progress in labor rights, and "lock in"" neo-liberal programs.(33) NAFTA is part of a much larger neo-liberal economic paradigm that has achieved near-total hegemony around the globe. As part of the neo-liberal program and in order to continue to obtain loans from international agencies and private banks, most countries must submit to strategies and programs that are "market-oriented,"" or "market-friendly"".(34) The emphasis is on deepening a nation's participation in the global economy, while simultaneously cutting government spending and intervention in their domestic economies.(35) The burdens of such measures usually fall most heavily upon those least able to bear them. They exacerbate and reinforce the pre-existing problems and tendencies that developed and grew during colonial rule.(36)
The origins of the EZLN are not entirely clear. David Clark Scott, of the Christian Science Monitor, quoted a Zapatista known only as Jesus as having stated that the EZLN began in 1983, and that it grew from a larger national organization founded by seven individuals in 1969.(37) Journalist Ana Carrigan also cites 1983 as the year in which Subcomandante Marcos and a small group of political organizers arrived in Chiapas.(38) Jose Luis Moreno, a guerrilla fighter during the mid-1970s, said that the Zapatista leadership emerged from the socialist-led "Grupo Torreon,"" named after a conference of socialist revolutionaries and radical Catholic priests who met in the northern city of Torreon in 1974.(39) Moreno went on to say,
Some of the participants had disagreements with the political philosophies expressed at Torreon. . . Six or seven of them broke away and moved to Chiapas in 1977, and we didn't here from them again. But we knew they were down there organizing. . . .We were socialists and communists. They weren't.(40)
Moreno's statement may be one of the earliest from a source outside of the Zapatista movement indicating that the EZLN was not a traditional 1960s/1970s style Latin American guerrilla organization.
Previous guerrilla movements had not only been avowedly Marxist or socialist in orientation, but also proponents of the tactics of Argentine revolutionary Ernesto "Che"" Guevara. Guevara had argued that in societies in which the majority of people suffered from extreme economic inequality, the injection of an armed band of dedicated revolutionaries (a "foco""), as few as thirty to fifty in number, could create the objective conditions necessary for a successful revolution through violent attacks on the state's instruments of repression.(41) The theory was explicitly elitist. The actions of the guerrilla "foco"" would gain people's attention, and in so doing raise awareness that their rulers were not all-powerful but were indeed vulnerable to popular resistance.(42) The organizational structure was strictly military, the ultimate aim being the seizure of political power. While the ideology of the original Zapatistas is ambiguous, it is safe to say that it borrowed heavily from Guevarista thought, at least in terms of tactics.
The Zapatistas that first entered Chiapas did not find an a-political, unorganized peasantry waiting to be molded. By the time Marcos and his associates arrived in the Chiapas' rainforest, the indigenous peoples had been analyzing and discussing their problems for the better part of a decade and had already developed an acute awareness of their rights and needs.(43) As Subcomandante Marcos explained,
On the one hand there was the initial program of the Zapatista Army: a completely undemocratic and authoritarian program, as undemocratic and authoritarian as any can be; and on the other there was the indigenous tradition, that before the Conquest was a way of life, and that after the Conquest became their only way of surviving. . . . The communities, isolated, cornered, saw themselves obligated to defend themselves collectively, to govern themselves collectively.(44)
At first, people turned to the Zapatistas to create self-defense units against the guardias blancas. Significantly, the nascent rebel group found itself having to change its methods and assumptions in order to survive and have any chance of gaining further support. The natives of Chiapas had already developed (or re-discovered) their own forms of organization and decision-making. The classical, vertical structure of a revolutionary guerrilla movement would not work; any army that the Zapatistas might recruit would have to submit to the collective decision-making authority of village assemblies.(45) Today, the EZLN's general command, the Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee (CCRI), remains a civilian body elected democratically in popular assemblies by representatives of pro-Zapatista communities. Two other important principals took hold as well -- the EZLN leadership is barred from owning property or holding political office.(46) Before exploring the EZLN's philosophy any further, it is necessary to outline some basic concepts of postmodernism.
Representing a variety of philosophies, it would be difficult to describe in full the range of postmodern thought within the confines of this paper. Some generalities, are discernible, however. Postmodernism ". . .rejects epistemological assumptions, refutes methodological conventions, resists knowledge claims, obscures all versions of truth, and dismisses policy recommendations.""(47) Postmodernists reject the notion that a single "Truth"" exists. At best, there are only "truths"" that are ". . .necessarily fragmentary, discontinuous, and changing. . .""(48) Since there are multiple truths and multiple realities, no one can legitimately establish absolute standards of judgment or interpretation. Any claims of knowledge are necessarily partial, personal, temporary, contextual, and arise from introspection, daily life, and the interplay of individuals and their interpretations of numerous texts (texts being any phenomena from a particular book to life itself). Consequently, postmodernists seek to deconstruct the familiar and concern themselves with the marginal, the secret, the irrational, the unfamiliar, the repressed -- the exceptions to the rules.
While much of postmodernism rejects political activity,(49) some postmodernists have struggled to redefine political activity and have outlined several features of a new politics which remarkably enough, resonates with many "traditionally"" anarchist positions. A "postmodern politic"" emphasizes grass-roots activity, voluntary associations, openness to other world views, and expresses no faith in conventional political parties.(50) Furthermore, postmodern political action generally aims at arousing aspirations, raising consciousness, exploring the politics of identity, and opening up opportunities for those who are on the margins.(51) In the Third World, postmodern social movements are particularly cynical about efforts to seize control of the state because, they argue, the socialist or Marxist national liberation movements of the past failed to produce much of consequence when they did gain power.(52)
Todd May, a philosophy professor at Clemson University, places postmodernist political activity in the realm of the tactical, and it is in this sense that the label "postmodern"" might best fit the Zapatista movement. For those who espouse a tactical political philosophy, there is no center within which power is located, rather it arises from many different sites.(53) Tactical thought rejects the idea of liberation through a vanguard -- if the sites of oppression are numerous and intersecting, it is hardly likely that any one set of individuals will find itself particularly suited to play a vanguardist role in political change.(54) Broadly speaking, how has the EZLN program reflected a postmodern vision?
EZLN -- Philosophy and Practice
"We have begun the struggle that is necessary to meet the demands that never have been met by the Mexican state: work, land, shelter, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and peace."" -- EZLN Editorial December 31, 1993 (55)
It is always difficult to separate philosophy from practice when studying an ongoing revolutionary movement. It is no less difficult in the case of the Zapatistas. The EZLN often mixes references to the great heroes of Mexico's revolutionary past such as Emiliano Zapata and Benito Juarez with pop-culture references. Though ostensibly a guerrilla movement, they justify their activities by referring to the Mexican constitution.(56) While demanding an end to PRI control of the Mexican political system, they do not offer their own slate of radical candidates nor speak of any "revolutionary proletarian dictatorship."" Such apparent contradictions, among others, have been the central source of much of the debate about the EZLN. Are they reformers or revolutionaries? Are they closet Marxist-Leninists or revisionists? Are they part of an elaborate publicity stunt or a new type of twenty-first century political movement?
The Initial Revolutionary Laws enacted in areas under Zapatista control appear on the surface to be very much socialist (or Marxist) in character. These include a Women's Revolutionary Law (which granted women the rights of participation, decisions regarding child birth, education, protection from domestic abuse, and work for fair wages), an Urban Reform Law (which included rent and ownership reforms), a Labor Law (which demanded that foreign companies increase wages, provide medical coverage, and make non-transferable stocks available), an Industry and Commerce Law (which established the regulation of the prices of basic products), a Social Security Law (which provided for the care of children and the elderly), a Justice Law (under which all prisoners except those guilty of murder, rape, and drug-trafficking would be freed, and all government officials subjected to an audit for misappropriation of funds), and finally, a Revolutionary Agrarian Reform Law.(57)
Of all EZLN demands and Revolutionary Laws, the one that resonates most with the past, and the one that the Zapatistas intended to extend beyond their "liberated zones,"" is the Revolutionary Agrarian Reform Law.(58) This law is a response to the almost totally dismantled Article 27 of the constitution, the article that formalized many of Emiliano Zapata's land-related demands. Article 27 "embodied the Mexican state's most sacred pact with the indigenous population.""(59) Changes in the article made it clear that not only would it be impossible for indigenous peoples and peasants to secure access to additional land, but also that existing ejidos and communal land holdings were in danger.(60) The Salinas "reforms"" made it possible to buy and sell these lands, opening them up to the inconstancy of the free market and the power of the rising capitalist class of large ranchers, plantation owners, and richer peasants and farmers.(61)
While including such traditional demands as the restoration of land to those who work it, and demands for the redistribution of medium and large land holdings to cooperatives and collective associations, the agrarian law also calls for the expropriation of agricultural and financial capital, and the reorientation of agricultural production to meet domestic consumption.(62) The Zapatistas are not calling just for the expropriation of large agricultural businesses, but also for the preservation of virgin jungle and forest, the creation of community health, recreation, housing/construction, and technical service centers in the countryside, and the elimination of taxes and debts on the collectively worked land of the poor.(63) Their vision for agrarian renewal is almost holistic. In this sense, the Zapatistas have gone beyond traditional demands associated with previous calls for land reform. The Zapatista program aims at a fundamental rethinking of rural economic policies and a movement towards community-based, self-sustaining, ecologically-viable agricultural development.(64) Roger Burbach, a writer who has spent time in Chiapas, commented, "They want to build new, equitable societies that will enable their Indian cultures and families to survive while they till their lands communally, using ecologically sound and sustainable practices.""(65)
The EZLN has linked their demands for agricultural reform directly to the national issues of NAFTA and neo-liberalism. While most sectors of Mexican society will feel the impact of NAFTA, its effect on the lives of Chiapanecos will be even more dramatic -- corn, a staple of the regional diet, is to gradually lose its subsidies as Mexico is economically integrated to the US and Canada.(66) The Zapatistas view neo-liberalism as an attack not only on the people of Chiapas, but as an attack on all Mexicans; neo-liberalism is to the Zapatistas what imperialism was to previous Third World revolutionaries The entire nation suffers the social cost imposed by neo-liberalism, which the EZLN believes also includes a loss of national identity.(67) A new type of nationalism emerges:
The neoliberal project demands this internationalization of history; it demands the erasing of national history to turn it into international history; it demands the erasing of cultural borders. . . .the concept of nation disappears. A revolutionary process must begin by recuperating the concept of nation and country (patria).(68)
The anti-neo-liberal project entails a reorientation of the national economic program towards ". . . .the most dispossessed sectors in the country, the workers and the peasantry, who are the principal producers of the wealth that others appropriate.""(69) Part and parcel of bringing the nation's economic development under the control of the Mexican people are demands for genuine freedom and democracy.
Central to the Zapatista conception of liberty is the theme of autonomy. Zapata himself had declared that,
. . . .Municipal liberty is the first and most important of democratic institutions, since nothing is more natural or worthy of respect than the right which the citizens of any settlement have of arranging by themselves the affairs of their common life and of resolving as best suits them the interests and needs of their locality.(70)
The EZLN's conception is more properly postmodern (or as Todd May argues, anarchistic). For the Zapatistas, autonomy is not only a local affair; it is a new understanding of the necessity of minimizing the power of any state institutions vis-à-vis civil or local institutions.(71) The administrative and political autonomy that the Zapatistas call for is not a token recognition of indigenous traditions or the establishment of reservations along the North American model -- they seek official recognition of self-government in the Indian territories, at all levels, nationwide.(72) For the Zapatistas,
Autonomy is protection of indigenous culture; indigenous communities deciding how they want to live, and having a respected place in Mexican society. . . .Our thought is that people in our own communities can run our own affairs, and be able to elect and recall our own leaders at any time, both locally and nationally. Autonomy means communities arguing, discussing, planning, deciding how we want to live, how we want to share the wealth, and presenting our plans to the national government.(73) (emphasis added)
The democracy described by the EZLN is neither bourgeois representative nor democratic centralist in form or content. Neil Harvey, a political scientist at Brown University who has done research in Chiapas, stated, "There is never a 60-40 vote in indigenous communities. . . They keep discussing it [an issue] until everybody is in agreement,"" the process can take, ". . .from several days to several months.""(74) Additionally,
Zapatista democracy is a hybrid of Indian customs and the ideas brought to the jungle by social workers and priests who believed in liberation theology, a movement in the Roman Catholic Church that emphasizes grass-roots religion and cooperation. As the rain forest was settled over the past three decades, those ideas have developed in a climate of betrayal by a succession of leaders that has fostered a general distrust of leadership. The result is an elaborate form of direct democracy that relies on constant consultation with the rank and file.(75) (emphasis added)
According to Subcomandante Marcos:
There isn't a fixed term that you have to complete. The moment that the community begins to see that you are failing in your duties, that you are having problems, they sit you down in front of the community and they begin to tell you what you have done wrong. You defend yourself and, finally, the community, the collective, the majority decides what they are going to do with you. Eventually you will have to leave your position and another will take up your responsibilities.(76)
As a consequence of having submitted themselves to fully democratic procedures, having learned important lessons from the people they hoped to win over, and having learned from the demise of world socialism, the EZLN has consistently rejected a "vanguard"" role and vanguardist philosophy. Again, they have moved beyond earlier guerrilla movements in both organization and intent. They have frequently insisted that one of their key goals is to open up space in the political system, not to impose a new system, particularly one produced through military conflict. The words of the Zapatistas are strikingly clear on this issue:
We make politics with bullets. To make ourselves heard. No longer to take over power.(77)
Furthermore,
We do not want a dictatorship of another kind, nor anything out of this world, not international Communism and all that. . . .We do not want to monopolize the vanguard or say that we are the light, the only alternative. . . .Our form of struggle is not the only one.(78)
If the EZLN itself does not want to seize power, then how does it expect to transform Mexican society and politics? The answer is "civil society"". The Zapatistas have issued a proverbial call to arms to all Mexicans outside of the established structures of power to take on the challenge of changing the political and economic system.
From the earliest communiques to the most recent, the EZLN has consistently demanded that civil society -- non-government and non-party groups and associations of professionals, students, workers, farmers, housewives, environmentalists, and all advocates of change -- join in the struggle to destroy the PRI dictatorship by applying pressure from outside the system. The EZLN sees itself as only one force among many necessary to clear ground so that the previously marginalized or otherwise excluded sectors of society can themselves decide what the future of Mexico will look like -- "We neither want nor are able to impose on Mexican civil society our ideas by the force of our arms, as the current government imposes its project on the country with the force of its arms.""(79) Marcos goes on to explain,
We are planning a revolution that will make a revolution possible. We are planning a pre-revolution. That is why they accuse us of being armed revisionists, or reformists, as Jorge Castaneda says. We are talking about making a broad social movement, violent or peaceful, that will radically modify social relationship so that its final product might be a new space of political relationship. I think that the main actor has not been defined. It is what we call "civil society,"" and it cannot be delimited by the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, the farmers, or the middle class.(80) (emphasis added)
The Zapatista's actions have mirrored their words from the start of the uprising. Perhaps no guerrilla group in history has made such frequent and meaningful contacts with sectors of society outside of their movement in an attempt to establish multiple dialogues. More than 6,000 people from independent groups and community organizations from around the country attended a National Democratic Convention (dubbed a "Zapatista Woodstock""), hosted by the EZLN just prior to the election of President Ernesto Zedillo in August 1994.(81) Enrique Cemo, a Mexican historian at the University of New Mexico, said of the convention, "This gathering may not have a precedent in all of Latin American history. . . It is a chance for an armed movement to merge with a strengthening civil society.""(82) The ideological flexibility and openness of the EZLN stand in stark contrast to revolutionary movements of the past and also to more recent movements such as Peru's Shining Path. In the convention, the EZLN re-emphasized its faith in civil society and in the value of various approaches to opening the Mexican political system,
In the National Democratic Convention the EZLN sought a civic and peaceful force. One which, without opposing the electoral process, would also not be consumed by it, and that would seek new forms of struggle which would include more democratic sectors in Mexico as well as linking itself with democratic movements in other parts of the world.(83) (emphasis added)
Again, Zapatista goals are distinct from those of previous movements,
We are proposing a space, an equilibrium between the different political forces, in order that each position has the same opportunity to influence the political direction of the country -- not by backroom deals, corruption, or blackmail, but by convincing the majority of the people that their position is best. I mean by this. . . .If there is a neoliberal proposal for the country, we shouldn't try to eliminate it, but confront it. If there is a Trotskyist proposal, a Maoist proposal, an anarchist proposal, or proposals from Guevaristas, the Castristas, the Existentialists or whatever "ists"" that you may think of, they shouldn't be eliminated. . . .in the discussion that we are proposing. . . .The rest of the country shouldn't be spectators. . . .(84)
Among the first tasks of a new national liberation movement would be the installation of a transitional government, a new constitutional body, a new constitution, and the destruction of the PRI-State monopoly on power.(85)
The election of Ernesto Zedillo, the PRI candidate, on August 21, 1994, came as no surprise to the EZLN. Of the elections, the Zapatistas stated, "The party-State system reaffirmed its antidemocratic vocation and imposed, in all parts and at all levels, its arrogance."" Further, they called the elections "a gigantic fraud. . . .the dirtiest ones in Mexico's history,"" characterized by a "multitude of irregularities,"" including corruption, cheating, intimidation, robbery, and lying.(86) Instead of renouncing their commitment to a variety of forms of struggle and accelerating military activities, the EZLN renewed its calls for dialogue and for a strengthened civil movement.
Reaffirming their commitment to working for change from outside the system through civil society, in January 1996, the EZLN called for the formation of a Zapatista Front of National Liberation (Frente Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional -- FZLN). The FZLN would be a "civil and nonviolent organization, independent and democratic, Mexican and national, which struggles for democracy, liberty, and justice in Mexico.""(87) Even in the forming of a national front the Zapatistas have broken the rules of traditional politics. Unlike other national front organizations, the FZLN was to be neither a new composite political party nor the political wing of the EZLN, but
A political force whose members do not exert nor aspire to hold elective positions or government offices in any of its levels. . . .A force which is not a political party. . . .A political force which struggles against the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few and against the centralization of power.(88) (emphasis added)
The Zapatistas also called for an intercontinental dialogue in opposition to neo-liberalism, the formation of "civic committees of dialogue"" for the discussion of national problems, and the construction of new "Aguascalientes""(89) to serve as places for meetings between civil society and the Zapatistas.(90)
At the end of July 1996, some 2,000 sympathizers from forty-three nations met in Chiapas at the EZLN-sponsored "International Encounter for Humanity and Against Neo-Liberalism"" -- as a result of this meeting, supporters formed more than 400 new Zapatista civilian committees. (91) For those who could not attend the meeting in person, the Zapatistas are ready to move to CD-ROM format, making discs that would allow followers or sympathizers to visit their jungle strongholds via computer.(92)
The Zapatista movement's use of high technology and media is unprecedented. While Subcomandante Marcos has placed a strong emphasis on radio, the main source of information for most indigenous communities in rural Mexico,(93) he has harnessed all aspects of the media in a Clausewitzian manner -- as the extension of politics by other means.(94) Although guerrilla movements have always sought to use the media to gain attention and promulgate their views, the EZLN has waged a virtual information war from the outset. Only hours after the takeover of San Cristobal de las Casas on the morning of January 1, computer screens around the world flashed with news of the uprising and by January 3, Subcomandante Marcos himself was on-line.(95) During the opening stages of the military conflict, it was public opinion that forced the government to call off the war, just when the Mexican Army had gained the upper hand and was poised to invade and occupy the rainforest in pursuit of the retreating EZLN troops.(96) The Zapatistas have used the so-called "information superhighway"" not only to spread their views and garner national and international support, but also as a defensive measure, exposing the military movements of the Mexican army and human rights violations almost immediately after they occur. E-mail activity, and direct communiques posted on-line have served as a block against disinformation, as a hedge against government repression, and has even forced Televisa, the government-controlled television network, to report the EZLN's official demands.(97)
Postmodern philosophy makes much of the loss of the distinction between images and reality; images, in fact, can be no less real than reality in shaping people's actions and perceptions. The Zapatistas seem not only to be conscious of this strange late twentieth-century phenomenon, but have apparently made it an integral part of their strategy. Writer/Artist Guillermo Gomez Pena, has written of Subcomandante Marcos, "His persona was a carefully crafted collage of twentieth-century revolutionary symbols, costumes, and props borrowed from Zapata, Sandino, Che, and Arafat as well as from celluloid heroes such as Zorro and Mexico's movie wrestler, 'El Santo.' ""(98) Subcomandante Marcos displays an understanding of how the media operate and which actions are likely to generate bad publicity.(99) Additionally, the Zapatista leaders, ". . .seem comfortable around reporters and are skilled at constructing 'sound bites' for television.""(100) Again, with their creative and innovative use of the media and computers, the EZLN has transcended the philosophy and practice of previous guerrilla groups.
What have been the results of the Zapatista rebellion? The Zapatistas were able to achieve in eleven days of armed activity what the FMLN of El Salvador was unable to do in eleven years -- determine the terms of the cease-fire, force the government to sit and negotiate in their own territory, introduce into the spectrum of Mexican political forces a new vision of the future, and create a new political mythology in a time when most political mythologies are bankrupt.(101) The EZLN has skillfully avoided both government repression and to a large extent government disinformation and defamation campaigns --
. . . .If given the green light, the Mexican federal army could eliminate most of the Zapatista armed units in days, if not hours. The EZLN's real power lays in its political message and in its ability to use the media and a global forum to get that message out. Its strength also derives from its defense of the Indians' cultures and societies, and in the Zapatistas' efforts to build a broad grass roots alliance in Mexican civil society that challenges the PRI bureaucracy.(102)
Ana Carrigan cites the unifying character of the Zapatista movement as an important result of the uprising:
. . . .Marcos has succeeded in forging an alliance between the Maya rebels of eastern Chiapas and a broad spectrum of grassroots activists in the Mexican civil society who also call for the political system to open up. This alliance if it holds, could represent the Zapatistas' most unique, and potentially most revolutionary, contribution to Mexico's modern history.(103)
If the alliance Carrigan speaks of manages to gain in strength and momentum, Mexico could face a transition to democracy similar to that which occurred in the former USSR -- a continuing build-up of pressure from outside the government and party nomenclature until a break-down finally occurs.
The historians Hector Aguilar Camin and Lorenzo Meyer, point out the persistence of the colonial political culture, a tradition of authoritarian tutelage, and a corporative tradition as the key factors that have allowed the Mexican political system to remain closed, corrupt, and virtually unchallenged for so many decades.(104) The Zapatista movement may change all that. Three reasons why come to mind: first, the EZLN's demands are sufficiently broad that were the system to meet them, it could not do so while remaining closed; second, by applying pressure from outside the system and by not seeking political office, the traditional mechanism of co-optation is critical short-circuited; and, third, the creation of a broad civic front might also short-circuit the system's other traditional mechanism for preventing change -- the doling-out of benefits to individual sectors in exchange for their acquiescence.
The Zapatista movement has attempted to change the rules of the Mexican political game in a radically new way. They have indeed gone beyond the traditional strategies and tactics of previous revolutionary movements through the practice of a postmodern politic.
(1) Autonomedia Editorial Collective. Zapatistas! Documents of the New Mexican Revolution (New York: Autonomedia, 1994) 68. (2) After the revolt, reports surfaced that not only had the government of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari known of the existence of the guerrillas, but that the government's failure to forestall the uprising resulted from Salinas's decision to avoid engaging in a counter-insurgency campaign while the U.S. Congress debated NAFTA. See Ana Carrigan, "Chiapas: The First Post-Modern Revolution,"" The Fletcher Forum 19.1 (1995): 87. (3) Elaine Katzenberger, ed. First World , Ha Ha Ha!: The Zapatista Challenge (San Francisco: City Lights, 1995) 44. (4) For good examples of this type of reporting see David Clark Scott, "Mexican Rebels Reject Talks, Vow Fight to Death for Socialism,"" Christian Science Monitor 5 Jan. 1994: 1. or Tim Golden, "Rebels Determined 'to Build Socialism' in Mexico,"" New York Times 4 Jan. 1994, late ed.: A3. (5) Scott 1. (6) Daniel Nugent, "Northern Intellectuals and the EZLN,"" Monthly Review 47 Jul/Aug (1995): 130. (7) Roger Burbach, "For a Zapatista Style Postmodernist Perspective,"" Monthly Review 47 Mar (1996):39. (8) Subcomandante Marcos, "The Southeast in Two Winds. . ."" qtd in Autonomedia Editorial Collective. Zapatistas! Documents of the New Mexican Revolution (New York: Autonomedia, 1994) 26. (9) Roger Burbach, "Roots of the Postmodern Rebellion in Chiapas,"" New Left Review 205 May/June (1994):116. (10) Burbach, "Roots..."" 117. (11) Carrigan 81. (12) Phillip Berryman, Liberation Theology (New York: Pantheon, 1987) 32-42. (13) Carrigan 81. (14) Burbach, "Roots..."" 116-117. (15) Burbach, "Roots..."" 117. (16) Burbach, "Roots..."" 120. (17) Burbach, "Roots..."" 120. (18) Burbach, "Roots..."" 120. (19) Burbach, "Roots..."" 120. (20) Burbach, "Roots..."" 120. (21) Burbach, "Roots..."" 122. (22) Katzenberger 33. (23) Katzenberger 33. (24) Carrigan 76. (25) Carrigan 76. (26) Carrigan 76. (27) Katzenberger 33. (28) Carrigan 76. (29) Carrigan 76. (30) Carrigan 75. (31) Carrigan 75. (32) Carrigan 75. (33) Katzenberger 178. (34) Michael Pelaez, "A Survey of Cuban Development 1959-1989,"" M.A. Thesis, University of Delaware, 1994, pp. 2-3. (35) Pelaez , pp. 2-3. Exemplifying the neo-liberal paradigm are the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) -- ". . . .Policies that ensure reliance on market mechanisms...including cuts in social programs and the reduction or elimination of subsidies (on food, for example) to further diminish government expenditure...The objective is to liberalize capital flows and to promote export oriented growth...The problem with this prescription is that there is little evidence that it works."" Mittelman, James H. and Donald Will, "IMF Conditionality, State Autonomy, and Human Rights,"" Annual meeting of the International Studies Association. Washington D.C., April 15-18, 1987, 9. (36) Mittelman and Will 10. (37) Scott 18. (38) Carrigan 81. (39) Tod Robberson, "Mexico's Ski-Masked Rebels Show Flair for Communicating,"" Washington Post 9 Feb. 1994, late ed.: A14. (40) Robberson A14. (41) James DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) 178. (42) DeFronzo 178. (43) Carrigan 82. (44) Carrigan 83. (45) Carrigan 83. (46) Burbach, "Roots..."" 114. (47) Pauline Marie Rosenau, Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992) 3. (48) Rosenau 79. (49) For further discussion of this point, please see Pauline Marie Rosenau, Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992), as the topic is too complex to be included in the scope of this paper. (50) Rosenau 145-146. (51) qtd in Rosenau 147. (52) qtd in Rosenau 153. (53) Todd May, The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism (University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1994) 11. (54) May 12. (55) Autonomedia Editorial Collective 51. (56) "As long as a new constitution is not created, the one from 1917 for us is the true one,"" Subcomandante Marcos, "Letter to Ernesto Zedillo,"" Trans. Cecilia Rodriguez. http://www.peak.org/~justin/ezln/letter-to-zedillo.html (22 Sep. 1996). Also, ". . . .After having tried to utilize all legal means based on our Constitution, we go to our Constitution, to apply Article 39, which says. . . .The people have, at all times, the inalienable right to alter or modify their form of government."" qtd in Autonomedia Editorial Collective 50. (57) Autonomedia Editorial Collective 52-55. (58) The Revolutionary Agrarian Law is somewhat reminiscent in spirit if not entirely in practice, of Point 7 of the Plan of Ayala which states in part, "In virtue of the fact that the immense majority of Mexican pueblos and citizens are owners of no more than the land they walk on, suffering the horrors of poverty without being able to improve their social condition in any way or dedicate themselves to Industry or Agriculture, because lands, timber, and water are monopolized in a few hands, for this cause there will be expropriated the third part of those monopolies from the powerful proprietors of them, with prior indemnization, in order that the pubelos and citizens of Mexico may obtain ejidos, colonies, and foundations for pueblos, or fields for sowing or laboring, and all the Mexicans' lack of prosperity and well-being may improve in all and for all."" Womack 402-403. (59) Carrigan 79. (60) Burbach, "Roots..."" 122. (61) Burbach, "Roots..."" 122. (62) Autonomedia Editorial Collective 55-57. (63) Autonomedia Editorial Collective 56-57. (64) Carrigan 97. (65) Burbach, "For a..."" 39. (66) Burbach, "Roots..."" 122. (67) Subcomandante Marcos, "Letter to Ernesto Zedillo,"" Trans. Cecilia Rodriguez. http://www.peak.org/~justin /ezln/letter-to-zedillo.html (22 Sep. 1996). (68) Subcomandante Marcos qtd in Samuel Blixen and Carlos Fazio, "Try to Place Yourselves on This Side of the Ski Mask,"" Love and Rage Nov/Dec 1995: 8. (69) CCRI "The Third Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle"" (70) Womack 264. (71) At the same time the EZLN may be drawing a lesson from the past -- in his home state of Morelos in 1916, Zapata had ruled that elections be direct and abolished all federal and state control over town councils in administration and finance. Womack 264. (72) Carrigan 97. (73) Commander Tacho, member of the Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee-General Command of the EZLN, qtd in Bill Weinberg, "An Interview with Major Moises and Commander Tacho of the EZLN,"" Love and Rage May/June 1995: 11. (74) Juanita Darling, "Mexico Rebels Take Pride in Own Democracy,"" Los Angeles Times 17 Jul. 1994, Sunday ed.: A4. (75) Darling A4. (76) Autonomedia Editorial Collective 292. (77) Subcomandante Marcos qtd in Samuel Blixen and Carlos Fazio, "Try to Place Yourselves on This Side of the Ski Mask,"" Love and Rage Nov/Dec 1995: 9. (78) Autonomedia Editorial Collective 64-65, 111. (79) Autonomedia Editorial Collective 115. (80) Subcomandante Marcos qtd in Blixen and Fazio 8. (81) Leon Lazaroff, "'Zapatista Woodstock' Links Rebels, Students, and Community Groups,"" Christian Science Monitor. 8 Aug. 1994: 2. (82) qtd in Lazaroff 2. (83) Clandestine Indigenous Revolutionary Committee (CCRI) -- General Command of the Zapatista National Liberation Army, "The Third Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle,"" Trans. Cecilia Rodriguez and Cindy Arnold. http://www.peak.org/~justin/ezln/3rd-decl.html (22 Sep. 1996). (84) Autonomedia Editorial Collective 298. (85) CCRI "The Third Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle"" (86) CCRI "The Third Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle"" (87) Marcos, Subcomandante and the Clandestine Indigenous Revolutionary Committee -- General Command of the Zapatista National Liberation Army, "Fourth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle,"" http://www.peak.org/~justin/ezln/4th-decl.html (22 Sep. 1996). (88) Subcomandante Marcos and the CCRI "Fourth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle"" (89) Encampments or make-shift "villages"" constructed by the EZLN near their zones of influence for national and international observers and supporters. Tourism to rebel-held areas of Chiapas has been substantial and has included the likes of director Oliver Stone, and activist Danielle Mitterrand -- Zapatista leaders have welcomed the comings and goings of the so-called "international red jet-set"" among others, and say the presence of outsiders provides protection against government crack-downs. Julia Preston, "Zapatista Tour Offers Mud, Sweat and Radical Chic,"" New York Times 13 Aug. 1996, late ed.: A4. (90) Marcos, Subcomandante and the CCRI, "Fourth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle"" (91) Julia Preston, "For Zapatistas, Talk Turns to Unarmed Struggle,"" New York Times 7 Aug. 1996, late ed.: A3. (92) Preston , "For Zapatistas...,"" A3. (93) Katzenberger 91. (94) Debray, Regis, "A Guerrilla with a Difference,"" New Left Review 218 Jul/Aug (1996): 129. (95) Deedee Halleck, "Zapatistas On-Line,"" NACLA Report on the Americas 28.2 (1994): 30. (96) Carrigan 95. (97) Halleck 31. (98) Katzenberger 91. (99) Robberson A14. (100) Robberson A14. (101) Katzenberger 96. (102) Burbach, "For a..."" 39. (103) Carrigan 74. (104) Hector Aguilar Camin, and Lorenzo Meyer, In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution: Contemporary Mexican History 1910-1989, Trans. Luis Alberto Fierro. (Austin: U of Texas Press, 1993) 266.
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