Dear Prudence
* Luis Herna'ndez Navarro*
The next government has begun sending signals about its vision of the conflict in Chiapas. Unfortunately, they are far from being positive. Instead of offering society and the zapatistas an evaluation of the problem and a road to resolution, Vicente Fox and his team have opted for spreading a collection of disjointed and contradictory opinions, marked by frivolousness and improvisation.
The struggle to resolve the armed uprising in the shortest time possible, the current status of the contacts between the EZLN and the future president, failure to carry out the electoral commitments concerning military de'tente made during his campaign, and PAN's refusal to withdraw their legislation on constitutional reforms on Indian rights: these are far from facilitating the creation of conditions between the parties that would favor dialogue.
The defeat of the PRI did not solve the conflict, it only created a new framework for promoting new peace initiatives. The problem continues down there. It is true that some of the actors are new (the president and his cabinet), but others are the same as always (the Army, the caciques, the regional power groups, the Catholic Church, the Evangelical denominations, the indigenous movement, the EZLN). But the bubble of optimism in urban intellectual circles and the middle class does not exist in the indigenous communities, much less so in Chiapas. Much more than words and promises will be needed in order to extend it to the villages and mountains. Actions are needed which will prove that there is a genuine willingness to negotiate the solution of the causes which created the uprising.
Because of that, Vicente Fox's insistence on ending an age-old conflict in 15 minutes is unfortunate and counterproductive, as is the statement by Rodolfo Elizondo, coordinator for the political transition team, that the problem could be resolved in one minute "if there were political will." It is similarly disconcerting that the Duranguense said Chiapas "can still wait," while Luis H. Alvarez says it is an "urgent and serious" matter. Who needs political will? Vicente Fox, the EZLN, or both? Can its resolution be postponed, or not?
Obviously, in order to resolve a war, the willingness to do so is necessary, or a superior force to that of the adversaries capable of forcing them to end their dispute, but that is not enough. It is not enough to offer the rebels re-entrance into civil life, with the argument that they rose up in arms against a regime that no longer exists. In Chiapas it is necessary to agree to, and to implement, with the insurgents, national and regional reforms which will remake the country on new foundations, which clash with the PAN's policy platform. Is Vicente Fox willing to negotiate those reforms and put aside the ideology of the party which brought him to power?
Are there contacts between Vicente Fox and the EZLN, or not? The future president's collaborators cannot agree. Some say yes, and others no, and some others are even saying, quite brazenly, both things, depending on the moment. Why so many contradictions? The matter is certainly delicate, but it is precisely for that reason that it demands consistency. The PAN spokespersons should come to agreement on what they are informing the public and not believe that the talks with former zapatista advisors are a rapprochement with the rebels.
But even more serious than this confusion, is that the victorious candidate has reneged on election promises to withdraw the Army and to commit himself to the San Andre's Accords. As soon as he had met with the armed forces, he made troop movements conditional on a basic pact with the zapatistas, and he threw the San Andre's ball to the Congress. Neither late nor lazy, PAN Senator Gabriel Jime'nez Remus said his party was not considering withdrawing its proposal on indigenous reform, despite the fact that it contradicted what was agreed between the Mexican State and the rebels in February of 1996.
The man with the boots has insisted on meeting with Subcomandante Marcos. He has not said why he wants this meeting, what he would deal with at it and what the steps after it would be. The future of a negotiation is thus made dependent on a simple personal meeting, disassociated from an agenda and a peace proposal.
In 1994, Ernesto Zedillo set out a similar route for Chiapas, which Vicente Fox wants to continue: the exchange of letters, verbal commitments to negotiation and personal meetings with his representatives. That path culminated - with the enthusiastic support of a PAN prosecutor - in the military offensive of February 9, 1995, in the name of the "rule of law."
Ninety years ago Emiliano Zapata was skeptical, with good reason, of Francisco I. Madero. Why should it be different today? If the new government wants to build a relationship of trust with the rebels, it must bear that lesson of history in mind. And, since an indigenous uprising cannot be resolved through election 'marketing,' it needs, in addition, a little of one of the cardinal virtues: prudence, dear prudence.
Originally published in Spanish by La Jornada
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Translated by irlandesa