FHUMAN (London) called this unscheduled meeting in response to George Caffentzis's report on the present situation in Chiapas, 'Don't Forget the Zapatistas!'. Initially intended to improve co-ordination among Zapatista solidarity groups, given the intensification of the 'low intensity war' against the Zapatistas since the refusal in January of the Mexican government to enact the San Andres Accords on Indigenous Rights and Autonomy of February 1996 and the absence of this theme from the Encuentro's agenda, it developed into a unique and enriching encounter between the solidarity groups, meeting themselves for the first time, and some representatives of the Mexican delegation. The original aim was to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the campaigns carried out so far, and discuss how to deal with the low press coverage of a 'low intensity war' which seems to be slowly strangling the EZLN (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional / Zapatista National Liberation Army) and the Zapatista indigenous communities of Chiapas.
Monty Neil of 'Midnight Notes' (Boston) told us of George's visit to some villages in Chiapas in June and of his concern at the apparent lack of any meeting at the Encuentro about Chiapas, even though the level of military pressure against the Zapatistas is rising continuously. The Mexican, US and other governments are conducting a Low Intensity War (LIW) through the use of the army, police, paramilitary death squads, and the physical and economic isolation of the Zapatista comunities, combined with a constant ideological assault. The LIW has been developed in response to the failure of frontal military attacks which only provoked an immediate and massive response against the war both in Mexico and around the world. The LIW has not provoked such a response, but the Zapatistas' survival depends on support from outside Chiapas. How can we think better on how to support them , even when it is hard to rally people because the situation is 'hidden'? The July 6 elections and the electoral periods before and since have had the effect of increasing the Zapatistas' isolation as the political parties, including the PRD, ignored the whole issue of the EZLN and indigenous rights in general. Cardenas' victory in Mexico City and the PRI's loss of control of the lower house of congress for the first time in 70 years gives President Zedillo an apparently legitimate 'democratic' cover for stepping up the dirty war against the EZLN and the EPR (Ejercito Popular Revolucionario / Popular Revolutionary Army) and their supporters and for continuing the militarisation of Mexican society in general. Within Mexico there was a reduction in solidarity work with the EZLN as much of the Left focused its attentions on Cardenas' and the PRD's (Partido de la Revolucion Democratico / Party of the Democratic Revolution) electoral campaign. If anything the elections have made the situation more difficult as the appearence of 'real democracy' and the existence of an opposition 'taking power' seems to undermine the Zapatista argument that there is no democracy in Mexico, even if no real change has taken place.
A comrade from FACMLN (Frente Amplio para la Construccion de uno Movimento de Liberacion Nacional / Broad Front for the Constuction of a National Liberation Movement) stated that all of Mexico was now militarised as the government sought to stamp out the EZLN and the EPR. However, those repressed have been above all legal organisations engaged in social struggles, especially their leaders. Over the last six months 200 comrades from FACMLN have been imprisoned. A leader of a street sellers union was illegally sentenced to 116 years of imprisonment, when the maximum possible prison sentence in Mexico is 50 years. Commenting on the July 6 elections and the election of the first non-PRI (Partido de la Revolucion Institutional / Party of the Institutional Revolution) government in 70 years, the comrade said that Mexico was still not democratic but Cardenas'electoral victory represented progress.
A FZLN (Frente Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional / Zapatista National Liberation Front) comrade in response to a question on the significance of the PRD's victory in Mexico City and much improved showing throughout the country, replied that one outcome had already been increased trade relations with the European Union, as 'democracy' now exists in Mexico. Another has been that internal politics are now even more conservative, with the PAN (Partido de Accion Nacional / National Action Party), the second party in Congress after the PRI, demanding a violent and immediate military solution in Chiapas.
It was then decided that it would be better for the meeting to be adjourned until later when the Mexican delegation could chose some spokespersons to represent a general viewpoint. In the meantime the solidarity groups present decided to describe their activities and strategies so that the Mexican comrades present could later suggest what new solidarity strategies would be needed now. The 24 groups present came from London, Madrid, Austin (Texas), Naples, Bristol (UK), Tourne (Belgium), Chile, Rome, Maine (USA), Catania (Sicily), Sassari (Sardinia), Washington, Brescia (Italy), Bremen, Oakland (California), Hamburg, Melbourne (Australia), Copenhagen, Paris, Montreal, Thessalonika (Greece), Nicaragua and Tokyo. Their activities were essentially divided in three parts: information and counter-information on the Zapatista struggle and the political and human rights situation in Mexico, including pickets of Mexican embassies and consulates; direct solidarity with Zapatista communities in Chiapas through, for example, participation in the civil peace camps and support for the construction of a high school in Oventic; mobilisation for the Second Intercontinental Gathering for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism and the development of links with other solidarity groups, NGOs and political parties and organisations.
The meeting was later reconvened and five independent representatives from civil society organisations chosen by the Mexican delegation gave a detailed update on the post-electoral situation and their suggestions for future solidarity strategies. Gustavo Esteva gave a very detailed analysis of the background to and consequences of the July 6 elections. Regarding the San Andres Agreements, he described how a special commission of the Mexican congress prepared a proposal for constitutional reform in late 1996 which was accepted by both the EZLN and the government and represented the best opportunity so far for a real breakthrough in the peace process. In December 1996 the government broke its word and the agreement collapsed, leading to the gravest crisis yet in the dialogue and a sudden increase in tension, repression and the isolation of the Zapatista communities in Chiapas. Since then there has been a continual deterioration in the situation in Chiapas and throughout the country, with the constant danger of direct military intervention, during which the PRI government has taken advantage of the lack of public interest in Chiapas and the change in the political climate due to the elections. Despite the impasse in the dialogue, the PRI regime has been saying that the Zapatistas must return to the peace talks without any further concessions by the government or a decrease in the level of repression.
On the July 6 mid-term congressional and state governorship elections, Gustavo described their result as the death certificate of the PRI. However, the body is still rotting and has yet to be buried. Two thirds of the electorate said no to the regime, with the PRI gaining 40% overall at local and state level and in areas representing 50% of the GNP. Overall, the PRI has lost control of Congress for the first time since the Mexican Revolution. This represents a huge blow to the President's previously untrammeled executive power over the legislature and the judiciary. The President also previously had immense economic power within a closed economy, effectively owning and running 62% of the economy. Since NAFTA and Salinas's privatisation programme this has now shrunk to 17%, representing a similar loss of executive economic power. However, despite this decrease in presidential political and economic power there is still no democracy yet in Mexico. The elections of July 6 were not clean. In Chiapas and other southern states fraud and manipulation persisted. The cacique system still exists as does militarisation, signifying that the old power structure is still in place. Instead, now there are many different centres of power and there is certainly no such thing as democracy within the political parties. Their decisions do not recognise any conception of 'differences', nor any understanding of the local participatory democracy of the barrios, where there has been a 'democratisation of life' through the autonomous practice of 'people's power'. The old power structures have done their best to create problems and stop this democratisation process in its tracks. They are very much aware of the struggle for democratisation and have increasingly turned to violence and militarisation to stamp it out.
Martin Lopez described how there had been fraud in many places, especially Campeche, the state of Mexico and Guerrero, during the elections, which themselves had led to a build up in militarisation both before and afterwards. On the other hand, the triumph of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas in Mexico City had led to a genuine outburst of popular celebration over the end of the PRI's grip on the capital. Nevertheless, in his campaign everything but neoliberal economic policy was criticised.
Damiana, speaking in an individual capacity as a member of the civil resistance in Chiapas, started by saying that the PAN represents no opposition to the PRI as they agree on neoliberal economic policy and the PRD is above all an institutional political party. She explained why she had abstained from voting as she did not agree with any of the political parties, although she described herself as neither anti-electoral or anti-party. The PRD had not taken any position on indigenous rights or on the San Andres Agreement despite the many letters it had received from civil society. Allianza Civica had made a survey to see if the necessary conditions existed for fair elections to take place, but the PRD had ignored it. The much higher than expected vote for the PRD was due more to the popularity of Cardenas than anything else. The post-electoral period has brought further danger as the government can now say that there is already democracy in Mexico and militarisation has become even more intense, especially against unarmed civil society.
Antonio Martinez told us that the first electoral breakthrough had been the PRD's victory in the satelite city of Nezahuacoyotl, near Mexico City, in late 1996. The high vote for the PRD nationally on July 6 represented a resounding NO! to the PAN as well as the PRI. The unlamented death of Fidel Velasquez, the nonogenarian leader of the CTM (Congreso de los Trabajadores Mexicanos / Congress of Mexican Workers), the largest trade union organisation and a corporatist partner of the PRI, just before the elections had been of great importance. The mass of workers did not participate either at his funeral or at the homage at the Senate, nor did the CTM attempt to mobilise for either event. The triumph of Cardenas was a triumph for democracy, which the government was now trying to play down, claiming that it had opened up and allowed him to win. The integrity of Cardenas and the opposition of the people had led to the PRD's victory.
Tania, an NGO worker with indigenous women in the state of Hidalgo, said that the main point for democracy as far as indigenous peoples were concerned was the San Andres Agreement. The abolition of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) was also crucial to the establishment of genuine democracy in Mexico.
In response to a series of questions from the solidarity groups, the delegates then gave some suggestions for future strategies of support. All the political parties had accommodated their position to neoliberalism including the PRD which had stated that it was not against the NAFTA during the election campaign, adopting a similar position to the British Labour Party and the French Socialist Party vis-a-vis the Maastricht Treaty. Many important decisions regarding the Mexican economy were no longer taken in Mexico. While Clinton's visit in May may not be directly linked to the increase in militarisation, the recent visit of various senior generals of the Mexican Army to the United States certainly was and represented the integration of the Mexican Army with the US Army in one strategic plan. The continuation of this counter insurrectionary plan through controlled 'democratisation' still left an option for the direct intervention of the Mexican Army should it fail. The number of arms and soldiers had doubled since the Zapatista revolt of January 1994, representing a huge increase in the size of the armed forces in Mexico. However, despite this increase in size, weaponry and training, the Mexican Army was still 'ridiculously small' compared to the geographic area it was meant to control. Ultimately, the increase in its size was 'insignificant' and was aimed more at symbolic intimidation and localised repression in Chiapas, where 60,000 troops are present , representing a third of its total forces, and in Guerrero and Oaxaca. The army also has problems in controlling the national territory because much of the population is armed, whether as guerrillas or drug traffickers, and dispersed throughout a very large country.
International solidarity with the Zapatistas is crucial as a series of struggles between relatively small local communities and transnational corporations have shown, the victory of the people of Tepotzlan in the state of Morelos over a leisure consortium that wanted to build a golf course on communally owned land being a prime example.
In response to a question on the 'failure' of the dialogue between the EZLN and the government, Gustavo claimed that it had in fact brilliantly succeeded in that the demands of the Mexican indigenous peoples had been nationally and internationally voiced for the first time, it had led to a significant mobilisation of civil society and had helped to reveal conclusively to the Mexican people just what kind of government they had.
Asked about the nature of the NGOs she worked with in Chiapas, Damiana described them to us as 'grassroots groups' which work with the men and women of the committees of support of the FZLN. The basic purpose of the assemblies of civil resistance is to have no negotiation whatsoever with the government, leaving open the only channel which is the EZLN and the San Andres dialogue. This strategy is part of the recuperation of dignity by the civil resistance which refuses to go on marches as before in order to have seeds and fertiliser from the government. The PRI government is talking as if the EZLN started the war, which in reality has always existed. Moving onto the question of democracy in the home and within the family, she replied that there was none despite the growing importance of the gender question among the social movements calling for increased education for both women and men.
Replying to a question on the effects of militarisation on women, Damiana told us how the Army was buying 13-year-old girls for prostitution, spreading the incidence of STDs (sexually transmitted diseases) and of rape. They aim to repress women who are the real heads of the family and the people who have pushed miost for the end of militarisation to be included in the San Andres Accords. In answer to a question on emigration to the United States, Tania said that there had been more emigrants in the last two years than ever before, with many forced to go to the United States in order to survive.
In conclusion, we were informed that a specific denounciations document would be given to the solidarity groups to send to President Zedillo when the independent organisations of the civil resistance had prepared it with the EZLN and the FZLN. The points it was going to cover are:
1) The San Andres Agreement on Indigenous Rights and Autonomy
2) Militarisation
3) The real exercise of formal power
4) Real power
They asked us to always include these issues in any communication with the Mexican embassy or consulate.
Finally, regarding the National Indigenous Congress, held for the purpose of uniting Mexico's disparate 56 indigenous peoples in October 1996, it was described as the first time in history that all the indigenous peoples had come together, despite being without any means of communication among themselves. They issued an appeal for old fax machines and computers to be donated as they completely lack these means of communication.
Patrick, FHUMAN (London).