Chiapas state elections:
Flooding, occupation and Mexican democracy


by Jess Kincaid

Perhaps taking his cues from the American dish detergent commercial, Governor Roberto Albores described the recent state elections in Chiapas as 'virtually spotless.' While his characterization contrasts severely with reports from elections observers and the press, this year's voting was certainly calmer than the burnt ballot boxes and violence that characterized the 1997 federal elections in this war-torn state.

In fact, the October 4th plebiscite may be the cleanest in the history of Chiapas. Albores' party, the PRI, for the first time officially received a minority of the votes cast, 48 percent. For Mexico's southernmost state, a traditional bulwark of the PRI political machine where the party has been known to obtain over 100 percent of the electorate in certain voting districts, this is a change.

While the Institutional Revolutionary Party did retain a tight grip on the state's political offices, winning 18 of the 21 congressional seats in contention, as well as the presidencies of 78 of the 103 municipalities holding elections, electoral support for the PRI is down from past years. Some analysts attribute this to both an increased politicization of the electorate and a state government trumped by local, national, and international pressure into allowing the opposition to occasionally win.

Cleaner--but Still Dirty

In conjunction with the opposition victories in many parts of the country last year, including the left-center Party of the Democratic Revolution's (PRD) ascension to the second-highest political seat in the country with Cuauhtemoc Cardenas' victory in Mexico City, this year's elections may reflect some alteration of the political landscape. These signs, however, do not necessarily point to a more democratic future for Mexico.

Reports indicate an abstention rate of approximately 60 percent on October 4th, and domestic and international elections observers as well as the press reported serious violations on the part of the ruling party. Running the spectrum from PRI electoral propaganda being posted above the ballot box to PRI officials purchasing electoral credentials and altering vote counts, to known paramilitary members loyal to the PRI manning electoral booths and frightening away opposition supporters, these electoral violations illustrate a reality of continued authoritarianism in the state.

Even these breaches of fair play on the day of the vote, however, do not reflect the most significant problems of the election. The combination of biblical flooding with broad-based military and paramilitary occupation of the state prevented the possibility of free and fair elections as well as compliance with state electoral law.

According to reports on pre-electoral conditions from the independent watch-dog organization the Civic Alliance (Alianza Civica or AC), these two factors resulted in an estimated fifty-nine percent of the electorate not being guaranteed the minimum requirements for a free and fair electoral process as defined by the United Nations.

The Politics of Flooding

The floods resulted in seven of 24 state electoral districts lacking conditions to allow for the participation of their voters, representing 32 percent of Chiapas' electorate. Loss of electoral credentials, the displacement of large numbers of voters, and the inability of the state government to give notice of the locations of voting booths and carry out other preparatory activities in accordance with the law undermined the capacity to hold elections in those districts. The State Electoral Council recognized this situation in early public statements regarding the upcoming elections, but suddenly reversed it's position 6 days later, choosing to suspend elections in only three of the seven affected districts.

That move has been criticized Mexican non-government organizations and the opposition parties as a political decision designed to assure that the state congress could be inaugurated and the political fallout of delaying the state legislative session avoided.

State law maintains that in order to inaugurate the congress, at least 21 of it's 40 members must be present. Twenty-four of the 40 congressional seats are elected directly by districts and the remaining 16 seats are awarded using a proportional representation system. Assuming that the 16 proportional seats would be awarded after special elections in the suspended districts, limiting the suspension of elections to three districts allowed for exactly 21 representatives to be elected, the minimum for beginning the congressional session.

Elections in an Occupied Territory

In addition to the problems presented by the flooding, the military and paramilitary occupation of much of the state as well as the presence of the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) provided another severe impediment to fair and lawful elections in Chiapas. Approximately 36 percent of the state's population live in areas where armed groups are operating.

With conservative figures placing the number of Mexican army troops in Chiapas at over 50 thousand, and a violent paramilitary apparatus operating throughout the Northern Zone and the Altos, as well as expanding in other regions, an environment in which citizens felt free to make their electoral decision was less than guaranteed. A recent unpublished survey by the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) found that three quarters of Mexicans living in army-occupied areas were frightened or uneasy about their presence.

In addition to the intimidation of armed groups as a deterrent, some communities that form part of the Zapatista movement to create indigenous autonomous municipalities also did not participate in the vote. Many of the 32 autonomous municipalities that have been declared since 1994 have set up their own independent political structures and chosen authorities using traditional methods. Given this situation and the monolithic lack of trust of Mexican government by many indigenous Chiapans, some chose to ignore the official electoral processes.


Source:

MEXICAN LABOR NEWS AND ANALYSIS

Vol. III, No. 18


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