After defining the procedural rules and the issues for the
dialogue and negotiation between the EZLN and the Federal Government
(the Parties), negotiation began on Table 1, Indigenous Rights and
Culture, in October 1995. The 4 tables for negotiation would each be
divided into three stages:
1) In Stage 1, lasting 6 days, there would be analyses and proposals
during which the Parties would bring in guests and advisors. During
this Stage 1, the EZLN invited various sectors of civil society to
the dialogue table (intellectuals, academics, representatives of the
country's indigenous groups, etc.), to give their analyses and
proposals.
2) In Stage 2, again for 6 days, the Parties, with a reduced number
of advisors, would attempt to bring the positions voiced during Stage
2 closer together, or, to clarify the points of agreement and of
difference,
3) In Stage 3, the Parties alone would finally negotiate a final
document by general consensus. And so, from October 1995 to February
1996, there was carried out, not without problems of possible
ruptures of the dialogue, and in an alarming context of violence and
militarization, the process of Table 1, finally reaching its
definitive signing in February 1996.
In March of 1996, the negotiating process for Table 2, Justice and
Democracy, begins. However, the process was interrupted at the end of
Stage 2 and prior to the reaching of definitive accords in Stage 3.
Without being able to cover them all, among the causes which gave
rise to the suspension of dialogue, we can mention:
1) the growing militarization and activities of the paramilitary
groups;
2) the sentencing of Javier Elorriaga, accused of being a Zapatista
and terrorist, meaning that the government was implicitly negotiating
with a terrorist indigenous group;
3) the growing number of Zapatista prisoners, simultaneous with the
dialogue process and the truce, among other factors. However, there
is another factor of extreme importance: the government would not
allow an armed movement the satisfaction of being the vanguard in the
Reform of the State.
Table 2, Justice and Democracy, had brought up profound issues of a radical change in the country, and this was combined with the EZLN's call for the "Forum for Reform of the State," the only experience in which almost all the states in the Republic, and almost all the actors of civil and political society, were convened for 7 days. In response, the federal government speeded up the stalled negotiations with the political parties in the Congress of the Union on the "Reform of the State" in order to circumscribe an upper limit in the negotiations with the EZLN. This was a much criticized position, since this reform was limited primarily to reforms of an electoral nature. At the same time, the government worsened the military, social and political conditions, in order to provoke what would be called the unilateral suspension of dialogue by the EZLN, in order to then move the scene of the negotiations on San Andres to the Congress of the Union, where it would have control, with a majority of the representatives being from the official party.
The participation of civil society in the dialogues which took place at San Cristobal de las Casas and in the municipality of San Andres were one of the federal governmentís greatest concerns. They had attempted to reduce the conflict to a local level and to separate it from the national process and from direct participation by civil society, in a setting that was not very favorable for the regime.
In this context, in September 1996, the EZLN made public their conditions for renewing dialogue. What concerns us now is the condition concerning the carrying out of the San Andres Accords on Table 1, Indigenous Rights and Culture. Although these Accords had been signed since February, one more step was lacking: making them a reality, through the amending of the Political Constitution of the Mexican Republic. As this procedure had not been established, the Parties entered into a political agreement, establishing that it would be the Commission of Concordance and Peace (COCOPA) which would draft the proposal. This Commission was made up of Senators and Deputies from the Congress of the Union, as well as from the State Congress of Chiapas (legislative branches), represented by 4 parties: Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN), Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) and the Labor Party (PT).
In the face of so many threats of breaking off dialogue by the Parties, and of the tensions which this created in the social, political and military environments, the EZLN and the federal government agreed that the COCOPA alone would be able to make an evaluation on the accord, in agreement and consultation with the National Intermediation Commission (CONAI), presided over by Bishop Samuel Ruiz Garcia. In order to not drag out the peace process indefinitely, whose signing was expected the following March according to the government, the COCOPA held the Parties to a vote of confidence on their proposed legislation which would amend the Constitution, based on a faithful interpretation of the Accords signed in San Andres, in order to then turn it over to the Congress of the Union for its final approval. In this way, the negotiating process would continue, with the following 3 tables pending in a similar manner.
At the end of 1996, the COCOPA completed its proposed legislation to amend the Constitution. The EZLN stated that, although there had been no provisions made for some of the issues in the already signed Accords, they would accept the proposal in order to keep their word and to continue with the dialogue and negotiation. However, the federal government retracted and objected to the proposal, arguing they had 29 observations to make to the document, despite the fact that official party legislators had participated in its drafting. This is the moment which is referred to when one speaks of the federal government's failure to carry out the San Andres Accords. These observations are closely tied to the ability to guarantee the Free Trade Agreement with North America (NAFTA) and with the European Union, the structural adjustment policies of the World Bank and of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the free flow of direct foreign investment, which the government negotiates through the Multilateral Investment Agreement: the use and enjoyment of natural resources, means of communication, "autonomy", land, among others. However, the government managed to cloud the root of their objections, and to put the emphasis on national sovereignty and on avoiding "balkanization," among other arguments, in order to gain support. The national debate was wide-ranging on the issue of whether or not the COCOPA's proposal adequately reflected the spirit and letter of the San Andres Accords, and Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization (ILO), regarding the rights of Indian and tribal peoples and the Constitution of the Republic, among other parameters.
Thus, 1996 ended in the middle of political tensions, with the resignation of the COCOPA expected, due to the lack of political will to move forward in the negotiations by one of the Parties (the Federal Government), and the supposed breakdown in dialogue, which had created a state of alert in both armies. The COCOPA did not comment on this situation, which could make the difference between the continuation of dialogue, or its breakdown and the consequent intensification of the war, and it remained silent while the political turmoil in the country focused on two diametrically opposed viewpoints. Adding to the difficulties, the COCOPA was laboring under a severe restriction: - which it does until this day - it cannot make official comment without the consensus of all the parties which make it up, requiring only the veto of the official party (PRI) to immobilize it.
During the first half of 1997, the country was engaged in the electoral process for the re-election of the Deputies and Senators of the Congress of the Union, which could create new power relationships, and which did indeed occur. For the first time in history, the combined opposition parties achieved a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, but not in the Senate, which remained in PRI hands. Nonetheless, this event created a new balance in Congress. Concurrently with this event, in Chiapas there was an increase in the presence of paramilitary and military groups in more parts of the state, the prisoners and the displaced were growing in number due to the political violence, a crisis which culminated in the massacre of 45 Tzotzil indigenous in the community of Acteal, in the municipality of Chenalho, triggering national and international reactions. From that point on, the government created a new strategy in order to climb out of the political abyss in which it found itself, called the "strategy of war" by the CONAI and by many other sectors, and with a double language: peace, reconciliation and dialogue, at the same time those very issues were worsening; in addition there were attacks against the CONAI, the COCOPA, the Diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas, social organizations, opposition parties and NGOs; there were the police-military operations, the dead, the displaced, the expelled foreigners, and more.
In the middle of these events, President Zedillo decided to present his own proposal (unilateral) for a law, in March of 1998, to amend the Constitution of the Republic in matters of Indigenous Rights and Culture, which, according to him, faithfully reflected the San Andres Accords, obviously raising the question, then, of the validity of any dialogue and negotiation process with his counterpart. In the face of this proposal, which sparked strong criticism, the PAN also drew up one of their own on the subject, with the result that, now, with three proposals, the Congress of the Union would be even more divided: consequently, none of them have been approved. Nonetheless, the federal executive managed to return the scene of the negotiations back to the Legislative Branch, where the official party has majority control of the Senate, taking strength away from the scene of the negotiations with the EZLN in San Andres, while trying to engage the Zapatistas militarily, an arena where the Mexican Army enjoys superiority.
Between the natural catastrophes (droughts, fires, floods, and now a severe winter is being forecast) and the political and economic catastrophes, 1998 has represented the worst year for Chiapas since the initiation of the conflict. In this context, the EZLN breaks its silence and once more launches another political initiative, in order to disentangle the dialogue and the peace process. With the Fifth Declaration of the Selva Lacandona, it proposes that it not be President Ernesto Zedillo, nor the COCOPA, nor the Congress of the Union, who decide on the future of the indigenous, but rather the people of Mexico. In order to achieve this, it proposes a National Consultation for the purpose of letting civil society decide whether or not to accept the original COCOPA proposal on Indigenous Rights and Culture, which the Parties had agreed to recognize. The reaction from various parts of civil society was to then propose a meeting with the EZLN, in order to prepare for and to plan the National Consultation. In Subcomandante Marcos' 4 communiques of this October, the EZLN welcomes this meeting, which will take place in San Cristobal de las Casas, and which will begin on the day of the Anniversary of the Mexican Revolution, from November 20 to 22. At the same time, the EZLN publicly announces the renewal of communication with the COCOPA, which had not occurred since January 1997, despite repeated calls from the legislators. In another communique, the group states that no one can provide a bridge to the federal government, such as the COCOPA and the CONAI, since the government only offers "abysses of war," and it calls on the Congress of the Union to contribute to peace and to join in the effort to stop the war. The "Coordinator for Dialogue" for the federal government, Emilio Rabasa, denied the EZLN's statements, averring that a "certain and swift" military strike against the indigenous was not being prepared.
The EZLN is proposing 3 issues on the agenda for the meeting with
civil society in November:
1) prepare the Consultation (when, how, who, where, what), which will
have a decision-making function;
2) reflect and exchange points of view on the struggle for peace in
Mexico (militarization and war of extermination, mediation, social
actors, civil society, Congress of the Union, COCOPA, dialogue model,
international actors) and
3) exchange thoughts on the national situation (the Indian peoples
and the popular movement, the state of law, human rights, democratic
forces, the economic and social situation of the country). Thus, once
again, the indigenous recover the political initiative and are the
ones who once again call the nation to a debate concerning the
destiny of the country and of the indigenous themselves, removing it
from the Congress of the Union, after its hijacking by the federal
government.
In order to plan the National Consultation in San Cristobal de las Casas, the EZLN proposes that the organizing committee for the November meeting have the following characteristics: be plural and broad, representative, with well defined functions, efficient, open and with the same number of representatives from each of the following groups and persons: social organizations, campesino organizations, Creators, Academics and Intellectuals; the Zapatista Front of National Liberation (FZLN), women's' organizations, urban popular movement, union organizations, the First of May Inter-Union Coordinating Committee, political prisoners, independent political organizations, student organizations, Network of Support to the Zapatista Cause, Caravan persons and any other organized social group interested in participating in the organizing of the meeting.
There was not long to wait for the reactions from these groups interested in participating. Even the businessmen from the Business Coordinating Council welcomed the initiative, and they have expressed an interest in being present. Nonetheless, confusion remains among some of the actors concerning the nature and the scope of this initiative. Despite the fact that the EZLN communique is very clear, the papal nuncio, Justo Mullor, is expecting dialogue to be renewed and the problems in Chiapas to be solved, prior to the Pope's fourth visit to Mexico in January of 1999. Other groups believe dialogue is being renewed, and the federal government is attempting to capitalize on that belief, reinforcing it with statements that the EZLN does intend to dialogue, in order to pressure the EZLN to begin direct talks, despite the fact that this is not the EZLN proposal and other conditions demanded by the armed group, and by many sectors of civil society, have not been complied with (release of prisoners, demilitarization, punishment for the material authors of the Acteal massacre, disarming of the paramilitary groups, etc.). Other deputies from various parties also believe that this initiative will lead to the prompt renewal of the peace talks. Similarly, the Governor of Chiapas, Roberto Albores, states that conditions are in place in order to renew the negotiations in a manner which is "direct," "serious," "without mediation," "without blackmail," "without conditions" and "without threats," while at the same time stating that, in Chiapas, "there are still very backward structures, from the last century, internal colonialism, exploitation, marginalization and inhuman conditions," and he launches this ultimatum: "It is the last opportunity for serious dialogue, and we will all do everything we can to make it happen." Meanwhile, the PRI admits that the Indians are still the poorest and most marginalized, and that "poverty, marginalization and ethnic oppression of the people has to do with the implementation of a development model which does not consider them as entities with a presence and with their own political rights," and it is necessary to "eradicate the vestiges of colonialism."
With the Consultation to discuss the destiny of the nation and of the COCOPA's proposed legislation, it is obvious that the Zapatistas intend to once again approach those who formulated the proposal, which will be put to a kind of plebiscite. Despite the fact that President Zedillo's government is now without the credibility, will or arguments to propose dialogue, it is trying to launch a campaign, arguing that the state is not militarized, that it has fully complied with the application of the law concerning the Acteal massacre, while at the same time the Fray Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center denounces its unwillingness to do so.
The EZLN renewed communication with civil society and with the
COCOPA, not with the government, which immediately denied the
possibility that the Church might mediate the conflict. The EZLN is
trying once more, with this new political initiative, to strengthen
the scenario which has worried the federal government so much: that
the people make the decisions. However, in order for this change of
scene to have sufficient political strength to disentangle the
dialogue, at least 3 challenges are present:
1) make sure civil society sufficiently understands the COCOPA's
proposed legislation on Indigenous Rights and Culture in order to
render its judgment;
2) define and set in place a method for gathering society's opinion,
and which will be credible in the face of public opinion, and
3) obtain a sampling of opinions which are sufficiently
representative in terms of number, municipalities, states and
sectors. By whatever method, once again the EZLN breaks the political
siege.
Taking the political ball out of the state's hands, and changing
the scene, will not be an easy task. The government can try, with all
their means, at least three things:
1) see that the Consultation does not succeed, boycott it, secure its
failure by arguing its impropriety from a legal perspective, since
plebiscites are not legal, etc.,
2) concomitantly, capitalize on it politically, arguing that it will
facilitate the Zapatistas' security for the consultation, that the
conditions for peace are secured to such a point that this event can
take place, and so on, and
3) pressure the EZLN to go from the setting of the Consultation to
the setting of the negotiations, without the carrying out of the
Accords and without the conditions necessary for re-establishing
confidence and credibility. In this way, arguing that they were given
all the necessary facilities, and still the people did not vote, did
not participate, were not interested, or that it is one more
demonstration of the lack of support by the Mexican people for the
EZLN.
The regime in power must understand that moving towards democracy, justice, peace and development cannot be done without the indigenous peoples. Paradoxically, the government grants autonomy to the multinational companies, to foreign capital, to the World Bank and to the International Monetary Fund for the free flow of their investments and conditions. In Chiapas, the government permits, tolerates and supports the "autonomous municipality of Chamula," in a manner of speaking and in comparative terms, where the PRI members traffic in arms, according to official statements themselves, and who are allowed to obstruct the election process with impunity, who expels the evangelical population, among other unpunished acts. In addition, according to a document released in Time Magazine, since 1921, the Mennonites have enjoyed an autonomous status, granted by President Alvaro Obregon - and still maintain - where it is stated that "they are not obligated to military service"; that they are not obliged to take an oath, that "they will have the most extensive right to exercise their religious principles and to practice the rules of their church, without restrictions of any kind"; that they are "fully authorized to found schools with their own teachers, without the Government restricting them in any way"; that "they may dispose of their goods in the manner they find most convenient, and this Government will present no objection to whatever the members of their sect establish among themselves, the economic regime which they voluntarily propose to adopt." The Mennonites, whose name derives from Menno Simons (1496 - 1561), a Dutch reformer, fled first from the Ukraine to the United States, when obligatory military service was instituted in Russia in the 19th century. For their part, the Hutterites (for Jacob Hutter), among them Tomas Munzer, practiced communal property, according to the model of the early Christian church.
However, the indigenous of Chiapas and of the country, surrounded by the military, violence and poverty, demand with their own blood what belonged to them for centuries: autonomy, their uses and customs, their education, health, justice, work, shelter, land, liberty, democracy. The military, police and migration operations have destroyed the clinics which they built through their own efforts. Foreigners are expelled who support their education through the formation of indigenous schools, as in Oventic, or for trying to construct a micro-hydroelectric plant to benefit the countryside, for the treatment of water, for supplying energy to the schools and health clinics, expelling representatives of the town of Venice, Italy; or through trying to train themselves in the transfer of information and broadcast technology, by expelling Tom Hansen. Or they steal and destroy documents, birth certificates, property titles, etc., in their autonomous municipalities and communities of the displaced. Or they keep more than 120 children in "makeshift schools" in the community of Taniperlas, when the military set themselves up in the rural school.
The federal and state governments have lost credibility, and once more they are building on sand. In an unusual move, opposition political parties from different points of the Chiapaneco geography are forming alliances, in order to protest the electoral fraud of last October 4, while the electoral authorities are ratifying the triumph of the official party in some of those municipalities and electoral districts under challenge, arguing that there were irregularities in the complaints as to timing and form, but not in their contents. After the PRI's "electoral triumph," Governor Roberto Albores Guillen congratulates himself for his personal victory and threatens to take legal action against Subcomandante Marcos, while at the same time, after the events of this year, stating that his government is not anti-Zapatista. The government tries to control the political environment and public opinion. They are now stating that they will launch an initiative to regulate the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and another concerning indigenous rights and culture, and another to permit the white guards of the cattlemen and caciques. Formal prison sentences are imposed on 8 Zapatista prisoners from the autonomous municipality "Ricardo Flores Magon" and residents of the community of Taniperla, municipality of Ocosingo, after the return from Europe of the outside leader of "The Voice of Cerro Hueco," who denounced the situation of the prisoners in Chiapas.
What is certain is that the government has control over the majority of the municipalities, and it is now recouping those enclaves in areas opposed to the regime, it controls the State Congress and the federal and state resources. Nonetheless, demonstrating that the government has not achieved absolute support in its evaluation of Mexico and of the situation prevailing in Chiapas, this month their were visits from foreigners from Spain (12 persons, among them Deputies of the United Left and unionists) and from England (the Vice Minister of Foreign Relations), in order to check on the human rights situation and the militarization. Similarly, Amnesty International and the Organization of American States (OAS), through its Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IHRC), expressed their concern for the human rights violations in Chiapas and for the excessive militarization of the indigenous regions. In addition, US senators have expressed their interest in visiting Chiapas shortly, and in promoting the "Leahy Resolution" in the Senate, where their concern is expressed for the conflict in Chiapas; also, a visit from the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights is expected.
Thus, not only does the EZLN break the political siege. Groups from different countries continue visiting Chiapas, without the government being able to contain them, in spite of the new regulations for international observers. Although Bishop Samuel Ruiz Garcia states that the attacks against the Diocese of San Cristobal de las Casas "must be resisted," in the face of 28 churches closed, destroyed or burned down, the extraordinary session of the Third Diocesan Synod is built solidly in the participation of the people; political parties seek new alliances; various organizations present new methods of resistance; various social actors leave for other countries in order to report on what is happening in Chiapas; expelled foreigners, like Tom Hansen, will be able to return to the country someday; and it is hoped that the Mexican government will soon accept the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Human Rights Court (IHRC) of the Organization of American States (OAS), since it has refused, since 1969, to accept that body's recommendations on human rights matters as obligatory.
Meanwhile, the government announces it will have to invest 1200 million pesos (US$120 million today) in order to rebuild the communications infrastructure over a 9 month period, devastated by the September floods in the state, when, Chiapas and Oaxaca, according to the Frederico Gomez Hospital, have the highest infant mortality rates in the country for diarrhea, with 90 children dying out of every 100 who present with this illness, 3 times higher than the national median. It should be remembered that, in August of 1997, President Ernesto Zedillo stated that "for the first time" the root of the problems would be attacked, earmarking 1200 million pesos (the same amount as for the repair of the communications system in Chiapas this year) for the country's poorest. One month before, the press had released the figures spent by some companies for advertising in 1996: Procter and Gamble of Mexico: 2,893,883,080 pesos; Colgate Palmolive: 2,522,305,560; Bimbo: 2,442,627,840; Coca Cola: 1,846,353,270; Cigarrera La Moderna: 1,654,273,010; Bacardi: 1,577,382,910; Nestle: 1,228,977,560; Kimberly Clark: 1,244,120,480, among others. All with higher expenditures than those the government spent on the poorest 40 million Mexicans (27 million in extreme poverty) one year later. Among the 100 most important companies advertising on television in Mexico alone, their advertising spending reached almost 70 billion pesos (7 billion dollars today) during 1996. This year, the comparison is superfluous.
Along with the previous, other myths are dissolved:
1) that the Chiapas problem is not a national problem. In reality, Chiapas, Guerrero and Oaxaca are national problems. Chiapas has also been, historically, one of the primary producers of the country's most important sources of income: oil, coffee and tourism; it could be the natural passage for the marketing of the TLC and the passageway for US marketing to Asia, along with Oaxaca and Veracruz, which make up the area of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, where they have tried to secure the resignation of Bishop Arturo Lona, staunch fighter against neo-liberal policies. Chiapas has warranted more than 20 presidential visits during this 6-year term, and it has been announced that it is the state which receives the most governmental funds for combating poverty. The democratic process cannot move forward without the inclusion of the indigenous, which has kept the Congress of the Union in a constant state of tension. The United States Congress is planning to urge a political resolution of the conflict in the state, and they may be visiting the state next year; some forces in the European Union are trying to tie the decision on a political and commercial agreement with Mexico to the problem in ChiapasÖit is a local problem?
2) that the Zapatistas are synonymous with the EZLN. The Zapatista movement is more than just those who have opted for arms, but also their bases of civil support, various sectors of society which, if they have not opted for the armed path, have supported those same demands, which transcend the indigenous sphere and reach workers, campesinos, students, professionals, businesspersons, among other sectors, who have all seen themselves impacted by the economic policies imposed by the IMF and the World Bank, by the neo-liberal and exclusionary project which has led to the closing of businesses, massive layoffs of workers, the impoverishment of the countryside, etc. More and Mexicans are crying out for the same demands: justice, housing, health, work, education, land, democracy, liberty.
3) that civil society is amorphous, without face. It is civil society once again, with faces and specific identities, who are embarking on the Consultation, and who are demanding a decision-making space in the political life of the nation. It is civil society which helped to stop the war and which participated with their proposals in the negotiations at San Andres.
Gustavo Soto
Center for Economic and Political Investigations of Community Action,
A.C.
|CIEPAC
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TRANSLATED BY irlandesa FOR CIEPAC, A. C.
AND NUEVO AMANECER PRESS
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E-mail: ciepac@laneta.apc.org
Centro de Investigaciones EconÛmicas y PolÌticas de AcciÛn Comunitaria
CIEPAC, A.C.
Eje Vial Uno, No. 11
Col. Jardines de Vista Hermosa
29297 San CristÛbal, Chiapas, MEXICO
TelÈfono: en MÈxico: 01 967 85832
del exterior: +52 967 85832