Chris Gilbreth
Global Exchange Chiapas Program
In November 1996 a new wave of repression swept Chiapas. The NGO community in San Cristobal was victimized by an abduction, a series of death threats and a fire bombing in the offices of the Coordination for Non- Governmental Organizations for Peace (CONPAZ). Later, a violent eviction by state security forces in Laja Tendida, municipality of Venustiano Carranza, resulted in three campesino deaths. Helicopters with tear gas and armored tanks attacked the unsuspecting population. At the same time in San Andres Larrainzar, a new group called the Mascara Roja (Red Mask) painted anti-PRD graffiti on a road one kilometer from Oventic (EZLN Aguascalientes site), fired gun shots at the municipal hall and made threats against Bishop Samuel Ruiz.
This uncontrolled violence, at first glance, suggests that the Mexican government has two distinct faces. On one side, it says that it values negotiations and is seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict. On the other, Chiapas state security forces are using violence against campesinos and PRI politicians are directly linked to paramilitary violence. The context in which this violence is generated is considerably more complex than it appears, reflecting a tangled interweaving of struggles for power at the local, state and national level. The timing of the latest escalation of violence, and past cycles of repression that coincide with peace talks, suggest a coordinated offensive designed to create a climate of fear and terror in an effort to undermine the peace process.
It is important to note that the November assault took place at the same time that EZLN delegates were arriving in San Cristobal, on November 4th, for the installation of the Follow- up and Verification Commission convened to watch over the implementation of the peace accords signed in February on Indigenous Rights and Culture. The meeting was to be a first step toward re-establishing the peace talks between the government and EZLN, suspended since early September. The violence in San Cristobal began on November 4th, with a late night fire-bomb attack on CONPAZ offices. The next day the organization's accountant and his family were abducted. They were taken to a house near the state capital, Tuxtla Gutierrez, and tortured and interrogated for two days before being released. During the following days the assault continued. Telephone lines were cut at four NGO (non-governmental organization) workers' homes and "Day of the Dead" flowers were placed on the door step of another. Dozens of telephone death threats were made, creating a climate of fear for human rights activists in San Cristobal. Some of the callers demonstrated an intimate knowledge of their victims' private lives.
Mexico's current politico-economic juncture does not permit a conventional military solution to the Chiapas conflict . While underlying conditions in Southern Mexico have important similarities to conditions that generated Central American revolutions in the 1980's, Mexico's current political-economic conditions have prevented a purely military solution to the conflict like the genocidal scorched earth policies carried out by the Guatemalan military in the 1980's. All-out wars against the organized civilian population, waged by authoritarian governments, as practiced throughout Latin America in the 1970s, are no longer tolerated by the international community. Mexico's fragile economy is highly vulnerable to criticism. International outrage toward humans rights abuses and prolonged violent conflicts have affected the country's economic well-being. In this context, the PRI government seeks to avoid any type of negative publicity.
To maintain the image that the government is a committed player in the peace process, the Mexican military is using a low- intensity warfare (LIW) to contain the Zapatista uprising. The purpose of such a strategy is to create an invisible war that uses fear and terror as an instrument for demobilization. This type of war is a long-term project designed to wear down the mobilized civilian population while avoiding negative headlines. Random acts of violence such as threats, abductions and torture create fear and terror while petty crimes such as vandalism, break-and-enter and theft keep the pressure constant.
In Chiapas, private groups using violence to maintain the status quo are not new. White Guards, or local gunmen hired by cattle ranchers and landowners, have been operating since the 1950s, repressing local campesino populations. Moreover, state-sponsored repression, political arrests, rape and "disappearances" have been constant in Chiapas since campesinos began organizing independently in the 1970s. Nevertheless, since the 1994 Zapatista uprising, analysts within the NGO community have noted an expansion and sophistication of violent groups in Chiapas. Cattle ranchers have strengthened their representative organizations and their ties with armed groups. Campesinos affiliated with the PRI have formed new paramilitary assault groups operating throughout Chiapas: Mascara Roja in San Andres Larrainzar, Chinchulines in Chilon, The San Bartolome de los Llanos Alliance in Venustiano Carranza, Paz y Justicia in the northern zone (Sabanilla, Tila, Salto de Agua and Tumbala) and Los Degolladores in San Juan Chamula. These paramilitary groups are supported by PRI public functionaries, large landowners and the Mexican military. They use violence and terror to maintain economic, political and social control. The emergence and consolidation of these groups since the 1994 uprising has coincided with a strengthening of "civic fronts"--political groups representing urban property owners, business owners and cattle ranchers.
Also, since the uprising there has been a notable increase of foreign assistance to the Mexican armed forces. In September 1996 the Mexican daily El Financiero obtained a dossier of 264 secret documents from the Pentagon under the Freedom of Information Act. The release of these declassified documents confirm that Mexico has been receiving support from military advisors from the USA, Guatemala, Argentina and Israel in its war on the EZLN and its solidarity networks. The documents confirm the presence of US military personnel in the conflict zone during the February 1995 military offensive.
There are many similarities between the 1980s wars in Central America and what is happening at present in Chiapas. In Central America right-wing terror groups grew out of political organizations representing oligarchic interests. These groups received financing and intelligence support from the CIA. From these high-level groups, smaller assault squads were created to carry out terrorist operations against mobilized civilians. At the height of the Central American low-intensity wars, political activists were "disappeared," brutally tortured, or executed, with their disfigured corpses left in public view as a warning. There is fear and concern that the conflict in Chiapas is moving in this direction. The structures are being created to unleash a violent offensive against organized civil society. Some analysts believe that the existing paramilitary organizations will soon become armed "contra" groups, operating directly against the EZLN and its support networks.
In Central America the local level assault groups were created with outside financing and coordination. In Chiapas the evidence shows that paramilitary groups have direct ties to PRI politicians, the Chiapan oligarchy and Mexican security forces. The Paz y Justicia is backed by PRI state deputy Samuel Sanchez and operates with the complicity of state police and the Mexican federal army. The Chinchulines are supported by PRI federal deputy Rafael Ceballos. The San Bartolome de los Llanos Alliance is linked directly to large landowner Eucario Orantes. Other groups in Palenque receive support from cattle ranchers' associations.
During the November assault, a recorded telephone message threatened 28 NGO workers in San Cristobal with death. The death threats hinted at who might be responsible for the violence. The first message after listing the 28 names stated, "Now you will see how your government really works." Several days later another message by the same caller said, "You messed with our ranches now we are going to mess with you." These threats, if taken at face value, implicate government representatives and local cattle ranchers. In Chiapan state politics these two groups are historically one and the same.
Chiapas's history demonstrates that the federal government has never been able to control state politics. The national social reforms sparked by the Mexican Revolution (1910-20) were successfully opposed in Chiapas by the Mapaches--a local armed group backed by large landholders. Later, large landowners obtained special "ineffectability" status that protected their landholdings from redistribution under Cardenas's agrarian legislation. In the late 1950s, Chiapas governor Leon Brindis passed legislation permitting cattle ranchers to hire their own private police forces to protect their land holdings--this was the beginning of the White Guards.
Most analysts of Chiapan politics believe that the current state government is not committed to a peaceful solution to the conflict. A report by CONPAZ describes two main power groups within the existing government. Under the current interim governor Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro there is a soft-line group that is more given to negotiations. In this faction there are current members of the Peace and Mediation Commission (COCOPA). Also included are sectors of the army, businessmen, cattle ranchers as well as strong support in the state congress. On the national level, the group is aligned with billionaire ex-Mexico City mayor and former Agriculture minister Hank Gonzalez. The other power group, representing the hard-line, is led by State Government Secretary Eraclio Zepeda. This group has ties with public security forces, the state attorney general, paramilitary groups and enjoys access to state resources. On the national level, the group is aligned with a power block that includes ex-president Carlos Salinas and ex-Interior minister and former Chiapas governor Patrocinio Gonzalez Garrido.
In September, the EZLN suspended the current round of dialogues because of its belief that the government lacked a true commitment to the peace process. EZLN delegates have stated that increases in violence, corresponding chronologically with peace talks, are not a mere coincidence, but form part of a coordinated effort to derail the peace process. For example, during peace talks in March, public security forces killed 3 campesinos during a violent eviction in Gran Poder, municipality of Nicolas Ruiz. The PRD municipal president had declared the region in rebellion and in support of the EZLN. The same day security forces also evicted campesinos from six properties in the municipality of Venustiano Carranza. This was part of a state-wide offensive headed by local government secretary Eraclio Zepeda to violently evict campesinos from contested lands. In the community of San Luis, municipality of Pichucalco, 2 campesinos were killed and 57 were detained during another violent eviction in the same week. Secretary Zepeda said to the press, "The government will not permit those with masks to impose their own laws. We will not be hostages to the peace talks in San Andres."
The following are three possible explanations for who may be responsible for the violence being used to undermine the peace talks and why. It is possible that combinations of these three scenarios are operating:
A) The November assault against San Cristobal's NGO community may have been carried out by the civic front of coletos--the local non-indigenous San Cristobal oligarchy that is decidedly against the type of reforms sought by the EZLN. The fact that the attacks in San Cristobal coincided with other acts of violence throughout the state is more a reflection of the complexity of Chiapas's problems than a signal that coordinated waves of repression are being used to undermine the peace talks. The coletos have demonstrated a history of aggression towards the Church, NGOs, foreign human rights workers and journalists. The latest attack may be an attempt to frighten CONPAZ who the coletos perceive as a civilian front for the EZLN. Signs painted on the CONPAZ walls stated, "Get out Zapatistas, we don't want you."
B) The repression may be part of a larger coordinated effort spearheaded by Eraclio Zepeda's hard-line group in the Chiapas state government. Violence escalates during peace negotiations. State security police, alongside paramilitary groups and civic fronts, are carrying out a campaign of repression aimed at derailing the peace talks and breaking the Zapatista movement and its solidarity networks. As part of a struggle for power within the state government, Zepeda may be attempting to destabilize the interim governor ship of Ruiz Ferro. Because Zepeda's faction is operating in cooperation with a national hard-line power bloc, the actual attackers could be part of the military intelligence branch.
C) The generalized violence and militarization in Chiapas is part of an overall counter-insurgency strategy coming from the federal government and its international military advisors. As part of the LIW, the Mexican state is participating in the peace negotiations to protect its international image with a facade that reflects a commitment to the dialogues. Meanwhile, on a less visible level, the government is responsible for acts of intimidation, violence and repression. These acts are being carried out with impunity towards independent campesino organizations, NGOs, organized civil society and foreign solidarity groups and observers. The LIW has been escalated and paramilitary groups are becoming increasingly sophisticated and orchestrated from above.
CONPAZ analysts believe that the assault against their offices and personnel comes from power groups that reach beyond the local interests of San Cristobal's oligarchy. The evidence suggests that the attackers are professionals with training in intelligence gathering and covert assaults. CONPAZ representatives are concerned that this is the work of a military intelligence unit under the orders of the hard-line faction in the state and national government. They point out that the latest attack required access to internal information and a coordinated team effort. Those responsible for the assault were able to abduct a family of four in broad daylight without any witnesses. They took the family to a pre- planned site near the state capital and held them for two days. Nobody has come forward with information that can help to identify the abductors.
It is clear that violent groups are now operating with impunity throughout Chiapas. This violence conforms to the larger pattern of paramilitary attacks and state-sponsored repression being carried out in Chiapas with official U.S. silence. The November assault represents an escalation of the LIW being waged against organized civil society. A dirty war of "violence without a face" is taking place in various local contexts to further political interests at both the state and federal level. Organizations working for peace have been caught in the crossfire and the ultimate losers are the indigenous campesinos in whose communities the conflicts are being violently played out.
Global Exchange's Chiapas Program was immediately put into action during the November assault. In a press conference before the national and international press we condemned the acts of violence and offered international support. We began a coordinated urgent action campaign with our head office in San Francisco. Since the threats were aimed at human rights defenders and their families, Global Exchange immediately organized a team of international volunteers to stay in the affected family's homes. We also provided daytime accompaniment during office hours in various local NGOs dedicated to promoting and protecting human rights.
We recommend the following:
1) That the international community be vigilant and prepared to go into action should there be a future escalation of violence that coincides with peace talks among the EZLN and the federal government.
2) That international groups interested in protecting human rights create an emergency infrastructure that can be put into action immediately after human rights abuses are committed to condemn and denounce violence.
3) That urgent action campaigns denounce ongoing human rights abuses in Chiapas using letters, faxes and electronic mail messages (see attached list of addresses). Protests at Mexican consulates and embassies demonstrate that these acts of violence will not be tolerated.
4) That organized civil society in the United States initiates a letter-writing campaign to the new US Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, denouncing military cooperation with the Mexican Defense Department. Also, they can initiate a call for investigation of allegations that materials sent to Mexico under the rubric of the "Drug War" are being used for counter- insurgency in Chiapas. They can ask further that the US should not supply Mexico with drug-war related materials until Mexico's security forces can prove that they are not involved in the drug trade.
DATA SOURCES: PRODATO, La Jornada, El Proceso, CONPAZ bulletins (Taller de Coyuntura Nacional) and various interviews with members from CONPAZ and Chiltak. Thanks to Shannon Speed, Niki Karsin and Amanda Brown-Stevens (Global Exchange Chiapas staff ) for their input and editing.